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1.  Public Spending and Rural Welfare in Ethiopia 
 
In developing countries, public expenditure is one of the sharpest instruments that the govenment 
can use to achieve its development objectives. Perhaps a reflection of the attention given to 
public investment by international development organisations, donors provide an ever growing 
part of their resources to support the public budget of developing countries
1 or through financial 
support of public investment in sectors they deem growth-enhancing or poverty reducing.  
 
Development research analysing government policies has been extensive in the various areas of 
nonexpenditure policy, such as regulatory policy influencing the rules of trade, property rights, 
and the general operating environment of the private sector, or macroeconomic policy affecting 
growth prospects through its influence on inflation, exchange rate, etc. In contrast, research on 
the effects of public expenditure on development outcomes is less common, especially research 
that is useful for guiding policy.  
 
This paper explores and compares the impact of different types of public spending on rural 
household welfare in Ethiopia. The remainder of this section will first discuss the empirical 
literature on public investment and development goals in developing countries, followed by a 
discussion of the existing evidence on Ethiopia. To place the later empirical strategy and 
estimation of public expenditure effects into context, Section 2 begins by giving a brief overview 
of the key currents of Ethiopia’s development strategy and of development outcomes in the last 
decade and half. This will be juxtaposed in Section 3 against broad trends in public expenditure. 
Going into further detail in selected sectors, development strategies, expenditure trends, and 
performance of these sectors are also discussed. Section 4 presents the conceptual context for 
this paper and explores some of the challenges inherent in such public expenditure analysis. 
Section 5 describes the empirical strategy based on the conceptual frame of the preceding 
section. A description of the data and the results of this estimation approach are in Section 6. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
Among studies which examine the link between public expenditure and development outcomes, 
most fall into one of two categories. The first set of papers explores how the size of overall 
public expenditure or public investment affects growth or poverty. In this category, for example, 
Agenor et al. (2004) (described in more detail below) looks at the impact of shifting resources 
from recurrent to capital expenditure in Ethiopia. Aschauer (2000) compares the contributions of 
overall stocks of public and private capital to national income, and in so doing accounts for both 
the size, financing, and efficiency of public capital.  
 
The second set of papers seeks to trace spending in one economic sector to outcomes in that 
sector, or to broader welfare measures (e.g. Collier et al. 2002 on the health sector in Ethiopia; 
Roseboom 2002 on agricultural research). Also included in this category are studies which are 
primarily motivated by the question of aid effectiveness, and which in this context assess to what 
extent aid contributes to growth and poverty reduction by enabling an increase in certain types of 
public investment. An example is Gomanee et al. (2003) on social sector investment. 
 
                                                 
1 Examining OECD data on aid, budget support loans as a share of total ODA loans increased from less than 2% in 
the 1970s to up to 14% in 2002.   3 
The body of work exploring either the contribution of public investment in general, or public 
investment in a particular sector, can be a useful input into policy. Striking, however, is the 
dearth of research aiming at a particularly policy-relevant question, namely how the composition 
of public spending affects key development outcomes. Usually, the public investment decision 
facing policymakers, and deliberated on from year to year or in a medium-term strategy in the 
budget decisionmaking process of a given country, is that of how to allocate an existing pool of 
public resources across various sectors, rather than whether to increase or decrease the public 
budget. While budget allocation is inherently also a political process (in developing and 
industrialised countries alike) and while decisions on this will usually also reflect a range of 
considerations other than overall economic growth or poverty reduction, there is nevertheless 
considerable need for evidence on which types of public investments contribute most to 
development goals, as an input to that aspect of the budget process that is concerned with using 
expenditure policy as a tool to achieve such outcomes.  
 
Paternostro et al. (2005) give account on how the absence or shortage of research-based evidence 
that compares the effectiveness of different types of public expenditure in contributing to poverty 
reduction has led to developing country governments, and even more international donors, to 
equate pro-poor spending with spending in the social sectors, and orient or support expenditure 
policy accordingly. However, several studies (discussed below) suggest that in many developing 
countries, the greatest contributions in poverty reduction do not necessarily derive from social 
sector spending. It is furthermore also likely that, in the absence of empirical evidence on the 
development-returns to public spending, considerations other than economic development may 
“fill the vacuum” created by the knowledge gap. Hence research on the relative returns to 
different types of public investment may contribute to better policy in more ways than one. 
 
The studies analysing the relative contributions toward development outcomes of public 
spending in different sectors are methodologically varied. Marginal benefit incidence analysis 
has been among the more commonly used tools to assess the relative poverty orientation of 
various forms of investment. Ajwad and Wodon (2001) compare the benefit incidence for 
municipalities with different income levels in Bolivia of education, water, sewerage, electricity, 
and telephone services. However, this study, as several other studies employing marginal benefit 
incidence analysis, does not incorporate in the empirical analysis actual expenditure outlays for 
these public services. General equilibrium models, usually projecting public investment effects 
into the future, include Lofgren and Robinson (2004) using African country data, Dabla-Norris 
and Matovu (2002) on Ghana, and Jung and Thorbecke (2003) on Tanzania and Zambia. At the 
centre of several of these studies are the effects of education, although other types of investment 
are analysed as well. Devarajan et al (1996) employ regression analysis (OLS and fixed effects 
models) to compare the growth effects of public expenditure, both across functional as well as 
economic classifications. 
 
A series of studies have used panel data simultaneous equations models to study the effect of a 
range of sectoral expenditures on agricultural growth and poverty outcomes at the country level 
(e.g. Fan et al. 2000 on India and Fan et al. 2002 on China). These studies use aggregate state-
level data on public expenditure in several sectors, on public capital and sectoral performance 
indicators in these sectors, on labour and wage variables, and on agricultural productivity and 
poverty. The models incorporate the various pathways by which spending may affect poverty:   4 
Public spending on agriculture, health, education, and other sectors builds up public capital and 
improves public services at the sector level. Better public services and sector-level development 
increases incomes of rural residents in two ways: it fosters agricultural productivity, which 
improves agricultural incomes, but also enables more nonfarm income earning opportunities, 
which increases both wages and (off-farm) employment. Agricultural productivity has also a 
price effect, as it reduces agricultural relative to other prices. Both the price and the (farm and 
off-farm) income effects contribute positively to poverty reduction. 
 
The empirical evidence across studies on the relative contributions of public investment in 
different sectors is mixed, perhaps reflecting the range of methodologies employed, the variation 
in the types of economies studied, and the relative sectoral emphases of the different studies. 
Education spending has the largest poverty reducing effects in several of the studies (e.g. Fan et 
al. 2002 and Fan, Zhang and Rao 2004), but especially in those that are centred on the education 
sector (e.g. Jung and Thorbecke 2003, and Dabla-Norris and Matovu 2002), while transportation 
spending has either limited or even negative impact on poverty (e.g. Ajwad and Wodon 2001, 
and Lofgren and Robinson 2004). Devarajan et al. (1996) find some weak evidence that 
expenditure in certain types of education (subsidiary services such as school feeding and 
transportation to schools) and health (public health research) have a positive effect on growth, 
whereas capital-intensive spending categories such as infrastructure have a negative effect on 
growth. On the other hand, road infrastructure investment is shown to be the first or second most 
effective in reducing poverty in several cases (Fan et al. 2000 and Fan, Zhang and Rao 2004). 
 
This relatively large variation in findings suggests an evaluation of methodologies that have been 
used to analyse the relative returns to public spending. A thorough methodological review goes 
beyond the scope of this paper but, briefly put: the quality of analysis is likely to be enhanced 
when the effects of different types of spending are assessed in a common empirical framework, 
when the estimation takes into account the multiple pathways by which spending may affect 
growth or poverty, and when the common simultaneity problem of a policy variable like public 
expenditure is appropriately addressed (see also Paternostro et al. 2005 for further discussion of 
methodological approaches). 
 
If there is little research that provides guidance to public resource allocation across sectors, and 
that does so by econometrically analysing differential returns to public expenditure in terms of 
poverty, there are even fewer such studies at the country level, especially on African countries. 
This constitutes an important knowledge gap for the continent, especially given the centrality of 
public exenditure policy in many African economies. Certainly, part of the reason for this 
shortage of research could stem from the challenge of rather limited data, for example data on 
regionally and sectorally disaggregated expenditure, sector-specific outcome variables, and 
regionally specific poverty, income and growth indicators. Given the potentially high policy 
relevance of research into public investment priorities, such data constraints call for adapting 
existing empirical methods to the data landscape in Africa.  
 
As with the literature on public investment in the context of other developing countries, the few 
papers on Ethiopia are based either on general equilibrium models that simulate the effects of 
changes in overall public spending, or else are concentrated on how public spending in one 
particular sector affects performance in that sector. One exception includes Seifu (2002), which   5 
conducts a benefit incidence analysis of public spending in education and health. We are not 
aware of any other study comparing poverty effects of different types of public expenditure in 
Ethiopia. 
 
Agenor et al. (2004) and Collier et al. (2002) are among the more carefully done research papers 
on the topic in the Ethiopian context, and hence will be discussed in some detail next. These two 
recent studies, while otherwise entirely different from each other on the scope of public spending 
examined, type of effect explored, and methodology employed, focus both on the relative returns 
from reallocating resources from recurrent to capital expenditure. Agenor et al. applies an 
aggregate one-representative-household, one-good macroeconomic model to Ethiopia that 
explores the links between foreign aid, the composition of public investment, growth, and 
poverty. It conducts policy experiments to assess the poverty and growth effects of changes in 
the composition of public spending. Herein, however, the main distinction made is between 
‘government consumption’, or recurrent expenditure, and public investment, or capital 
expenditure, in three broad sectors: health, education, and infrastructure. Hence, rather than a 
policy simulation of changing the sectoral allocation, this study simulates the effects of a shift 
from recurrent to capital expenditure.  
 
The second paper, Collier et al. (2002), hones in on the health sector to explore how different 
types of health sector public spending determine the extent to which health services are used by 
rural residents in various areas of the country. They find that reallocation of public resources for 
health away from spending that seeks to increase the ‘quantity’ of healthcare toward spending 
enhancing the ‘quality’ of healthcare would increase usage rates. In this sense, as in Agenor et 
al., the key tradeoff in public expenditure at the centre of the analysis is that between recurrent 
and capital expenditure.  
 
Aside from academic literature on public investment, a range of policy and review papers 
produced by development finance organisations, most notably the World Bank through its Public 
Expenditure Reviews and similar reports, show trends in public expenditure in Ethiopia, describe 
fiscal policy and how it affects public resource allocation, and make recommendations for public 
expenditure management (e.g. World Bank 2002, 2003, 2004a). 
 
 
2.  Development Strategy and Development Outcomes 
  
2.1. Development Strategy 
 
In 2002, the Ethiopian government spelled out a four-pronged development strategy, its pillars 
being: the continuation of the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy; 
fiscal and administrative decentralisation; reform of the the civil service and justice system; and 
capacity building. The latter is a cross-cutting element, pertaining to enhancing skills and 
institutions in the agricultural sector, in the civil service system, and at the lower tiers of 
governnment. Thus, the development strategy involves both economic policies as well as the 
transformation of noneconomic institutions.  
   6 
Both the ADLI strategy and the trend toward increased fiscal decentralisation have informed the 
government’s public expenditure priorities. ADLI, conceived at the onset of the current 
government in 1993, is formulated as a long-term strategy to bring about economic growth and 
poverty reduction through a focus on agriculture as the engine of growth. Within this focus on 
the agricultural sector, ADLI emphasises the development and use of labour-intensive and land-
augmenting technologies, the commercialisation of agriculture, and expanding markets for 
agricultural products through greater export-orientation.  
 
The second pillar of Ethiopia’s long-term development strategy, decentralisation, has affected 
public investment by restructuring the budget process. The federal structure of the government is 
enshrined in the 1994 constitution, which stipulates that the regional levels of government are to 
hold significant autonomy in administrative, political, and fiscal affairs. Politically, wide 
executive and legislative power to the regions is expressly provided for in the constitution, and 
even their right to secession. Fiscally, revenue generation powers still lie predominantly with the 
federal government, and financial transfers from the central administration to the regions take 
place formally in the form of untied block grants. Table 1 shows that federal grants received as a 
share of regions’ total budgets is substantial, ranging from 60% to 87% (except for Addis Abeba, 
which has special revenue raising capacity as well as responsibility). From 1996 until recently, 
the region was the level of government with the greatest responsibility for making public 
expenditure decisions.  
 
Table 1: Regional budgets and federal block grants to regions, 1997 
 
Region 
Per capita regional 
budget (birr) 
Per capita transfers 
received (birr) 
Transfers received 
as % of budget 
Addis Abeba  292   12   4.2% 
Afar  216   159   73.3% 
Amhara  65   46   71.9% 
Benishangul-Gumuz  354   308   87.0% 
Dire Dawa  183   126   68.9% 
Gambella  670   406   60.5% 
Harari  572   433   75.7% 
Oromia  60   43   71.1% 
SNNP  32   19   60.1% 
Somale  225   163   72.3% 
Tigray  103   79   76.9% 
Average  252  163  65.6% 
Source: Own calculations using data from MOFED. 
 
As is also apparent from Table 1, there is considerable regional variation in the size of the 
transfers, normalised by population size. Addis Abeba aside (for reasons mentioned above) 
Oromia region receives by far the smallest block grants, amounting to 19 birr per person. 
Transfers to Harari and Gambella are over 20 times that much, over 400 birr per person. 
Interestingly, federal transfers are not allocated in a way so as to reduce the inequality of public 
budgets: the order of magnitude of difference between the largest and the smallest per capita   7 
transfers is the same as the analogous value for total regional budgets, and the same as the spread 
in the own-source component of the budget.  
 
However, a pattern does emerge that sheds light at how the allocation of transfers play out across 
regions, when comparing the size of the region (in terms of population) with the 
transfer/population ratio. Figure 1 ranks the regions from left to right according to the ratio 
between the percent of total federal grants the region receives, and the share of population in the 
region. A ‘transfer share to population share’ ratio of 1 for a region suggests that that region is 
receiving transfers in line with its population size, i.e. the share of transfers received equals the 
share of total population in that region. A ratio less (greater) than 1 implies disproportionately 
lower (higher) federal grants.  
 





















































































































































% pop % transfers / % pop
 
 
  Source: CSA; MOFED 
 
This ratio is measured along the right-hand axis and is represented for each region by the curve. 
For example, Oromia, the region with the lowest ratio, receives 23% of total federal transfers to 
all regions but its population makes up 35% of Ethiopia. Hence, its ratio is 0.67. The left hand 
axis measures simply each region’s share of the total population (e.g. 35% in Oromia). Tracing 
these two variables, there is a near-perfect inverse relationship between population size and 
transfer/population ratio. The larger the region, the smaller the transfer-to-population share ratio. 
This inverse relationship is only violated by the two city-states (darker-coloured bars) Addis 
Abeba and Dire Dawa, which have special revenue raising responsibilities and capacity. 
   8 
Recently, in 2002, a further shift of responsibility and spending autonomy to the wereda (district) 
level
2 was initiated in the four largest regions of Ethiopia
3, which taken together comprise over 
85% of the population. Mirroring the 1996 devolution to the regions, the weredas receive a large 
share of their revenue as block grants from the regions. Nearly half of regional budgets are 
transferred to the weredas in this fashion in the four largest regions.  
 
The government’s substantial and far-reaching decentralisation policy has necessitated a shift in 
priorities of public expenditure, both through the need for capacity building at lower tiers of 
government brought about by greater administration and policy implementation demands on 
them, as well as potentially due to differences in policy priorities at the local as opposed to the 
higher levels of administration (however, to date, we are not aware of any research undertaken to 
examine the extent to which weredas’ actual discretion in expenditure decision-making matches 
their formal fiscal autonomy. For a detailed study which, among other things, explores the extent 




2.2. Growth, Welfare and Poverty in Ethiopia  
 
Macroeconomic performance has been positive in Ethiopia over the 1990s. This period saw 
macroeconomic policies that sought to control the size of government deficit, keep inflation low 
and generally restore macroeconomic stability. Aside from the the transition period of the early 
1990s during which the inflation rate spiked to above 30%, inflation has since remained within 
single digits. The budget deficit, while not very low, has been between approximately 2% and 
10% of GDP and therefore within moderate bounds, with the exception of the period of the 
border war with Eritrea, where the deficit increased to some 12-13% (IMF 2002, World Bank 
2005b). 
 
Growth performance since the 1990s was moderate, and characterised by high volatitility. The 
beginning of the ‘90s decade was marked by instability after the overthrow of the marxist 
dictatorship, and during this transition period per capita GDP growth reached the low of -11% 
(WDI 2005). With the end of the civil war, the establishment of a provisional government, and 
the restoration of political stability, GDP increased from 1992 to 1993 by 17%. While the mean 
of annual per capita GDP growth was 1.5% from 1991 to 2002, 1998 marked another reversion 
to negative growth. This was the first year of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, which brought about large 
losses in agricultural production, and the diversion of a substantial amount of expenditure for 
war purposes.  
 
Despite modest but on average positive growth in Ethiopia over the 1990s, the country’s per 
capita GDP in 2002 is only 8% greater than income 20 years before, which reflects the overall 
very weak performance of the economy during the 80s, a decade of stagnation and even decline 
(from 1982 to 1992, average annual growth was in fact negative). In this sense, part of the initial 
                                                 
2 Weredas are administrative units below zones, which in turn lie below regions. Weredas, of which there are 
approximately 550 in Ethiopia have on average a population size of 100,000. 
3 These regions are Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNP (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples) and Tigray.   9 
growth with the emergence of the current government reflects recovery from long-term civil war 
and from the effects of preceding damaging economic policies. 
 
The moderate economic growth of the last decade didn’t translate fully into strongly noticeable 
poverty reduction. While poverty rates decreased slightly from the mid-90s to 2000, with the 
poverty head count ratio falling from 45.5% to 44.2% over the 5-year period, interestingly this 
was not driven by declines in urban poverty. Quite on the contrary, urban poverty increased 
markedly from 33% to 37%, while in rural areas the poverty incidence fell by two percentage 
points (MOFED 2002). This rural-urban differential in incidence change is even more 
pronounced when poverty rates are measured using spatially and temporally specific poverty 
lines (World Bank 2005d). This differential may reflect the emphasis on the agricultural sector as 
the engine for development in the context of the ADLI strategy, as well as other factors such as 
outmigration of the rural poor to the towns and cities. 
 
A regional disaggregation of poverty rates (Table 2) shows that the marginal poverty reduction 
over the latter half of the 1990s derives nearly exclusively from poverty reduction in the Amhara 
region, where the poverty rate fell by 10 percentage points.
4 For most other regions, poverty 
either increased or declined marginally.  
 
Table 2: Geographic distribution of poverty: Headcount poverty rates across regions 
 
  Lower poverty line  Upper poverty line 
Region  1995  1999 
Diff. (%age 
points)  1995  1999 
Diff. (%age 
points) 
Addis Abeba  34%  41%  7  50%  57%  7 
Afar  20%  43%  23  26%  63%  37 
Amhara  45%  36%  -9  65%  55%  -10 
Benishangul-Gumuz  49%  54%  5  72%  71%  -1 
Dire Dawa  47%  49%  2  65%  68%  3 
Gambela  35%  66%  31  48%  79%  31 
Harari  25%  29%  4  43%  47%  4 
Oromiya  28%  32%  4  46%  52%  6 
SNNP  49%  48%  -1  67%  65%  -2 
Somale  8%  15%  7  18%  33%  15 
Tigray  45%  49%  4  66%  69%  3 
Source: World Bank (2005d) 
 
Poverty is most prevalent in the two small western regions Benshangul-Gumuz and (especially in 
the latter year, 1999) Gambella. SNNP’s poverty rate was among the highest in 1995. As was 
seen in Section 2.1 and will also be apparent in later sections, while poverty and income 
measures show the two western regions to be among the worst off, both investments as well as 
public capital variables that may reflect investments, are among the highest, especially for 
Gambella. Interestingly, Somale region enjoys by far the lowest poverty incidence, in both time 
periods and using either poverty line. Afar (in the earlier period) and Harari (in 1999) follow as 
                                                 
4 The distinction between upper and lower poverty lines derives from two different ways of calculating the poverty 
line, whereby the former uses a ‘poorer’ reference group for the calculation of the poverty line than does the latter. 
For more details, see World Bank (2000d), p. 16.   10 
the the regions with the next lowest rates of poverty. It is also noteworthy that the two city-states 
Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa are at or below the medium among regions. 
 
In assessing average welfare, we will concentrate on rural welfare given that that is the central 
variable of interest in the analysis of public investment impact to follow. While on average the 
percentage of people in poverty has moderately declined in the rural areas, average rural welfare 
has actually fallen, as seen in Figures 2a and 2b (which reflect Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Overall, rural household welfare declined by a slight 2%, driven by welfare declines in eight out 
of the eleven regions. The two figures rank regions by their initial (1995) average per capita 
household welfare. In so doing, Figure 2a shows an inverse relationship between initial welfare 
and subsequent welfare growth. 
 






















































































Figure 2b: Change in per capita household expenditure 1995/96 – 1999/00 
 















































































Based on the Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure (HICE) surveys. Source: CSA (2001).   11 
 
Figure 3 represents, like Figure 2, a disaggregated picture of household welfare, but is based on 
different nationwide survey and provides a further breakdown of large regions’ mean household 
expenditure by groups of zones (see Table A2 in the Appendix for further detail on Figure 3). 
The two representations of the geographic distribution of welfare are broadly consistent with 
each other.  
 
























































































































































































Based on the Welfare Monitoring (WM) surveys. Source: World Bank (2005d). 
 
The general picture that emerges with regard to the geographic distribution of wellbeing, 
drawing on both poverty and mean income estimates above, is: Residents of the two western 
regions Gambella and Beneshangul-Gumuz, and the Southern region, are the least well off; 
Highest incomes and lowest poverty rates are found in the pastoralist region Somale and the 
small dominantly urban eastern region Harari; and the only notable improvement in poverty 
incidence as well as average household incomes was achieved in Amhara region. 
 
 
3.  Strategies, Public Spending, and Performance in Key Sectors 
 
Public expenditure trends since the conception of ADLI in 1993 only partially reflect the 
agricultural development orientation of the government’s strategy. While those sectors seen as 
important to poverty reduction (agriculture, natural resource development, health, education, 
road infrastructure, etc.) have been absorbing an increasingly larger share of non-defence 
spending, amongst these sectors, the proportion of expenditure on agriculture first declined until 
1996 and then moderately increased (see Table 3).  
   12 






Nat.resources  Education   Health 
Transport & 
Communication  Road
1   Total 
1984  16.9  39.4  24.1  7.9  6.4  5.3  100 
1989  14.3  38.9  28.5  10.0  5.1  3.2  100 
1994  7.3  28.1  29.1  11.1  5.0  19.3  100 
1995  9.4  26.8  31.9  11.1  5.2  15.6  100 
1996  14.9  24.9  26.9  10.8  7.4  15.0  100 
1997  8.1  24.8  30.9  13.1  4.2  19.0  100 
1998  7.7  28.2  29.2  10.9  6.4  17.6  100 
1999  5.8  26.8  30.4  10.7  6.2  20.0  100 
Source: World Bank 2004a. 
1Only capital expenditure; however, road capital expenditure trends to make up nearly all of roads expenditure that 
goes through the public budget; see also Table 6) 
 
But ADLI does not only imply increasing expenditure on agriculture, but also greater investment 
in public goods that predominantly benefit households relying directly on agriculture, and that 
are instrumental in bringing about the transformation of the agricultural sector from a subsistence 
sector to one that contributes to commercial activity and to the country’s export revenue. 
Expenditure policy in these sectors is discussed in more detail in the subsections below.  
 
As Table 4 shows, decentralisation of public investment responsibility has gone further in the 
social sectors than in infrastructure (energy, road infrastructure, transport and communication). 
The share of federal level expenditure to countrywide expenditure in the energy sector is as high 
as 97%, whereas in education and health federal expenditures make up only 25% and 16%, 
respectively, of total government spending in these areas.  
 
Table 4: Composition of total expenditure by level of government (in million Birr and as % 






governments  National Total 
Roads  598.73   461.06   1059.79  
  56.5%  43.5%  100% 
Education  429.92   1272.82   1702.74  
  25.2%  74.8%  100% 
Health  104.54   533.82   638.36  
  16.4%  83.6%  100% 
Agriculture  569.58   589.66   1159.23  
  49.1%  50.9%  100% 
Natural resource devt.  122.15   366.86   489.01  
  25.0%  75.0%  100% 
Energy & Mining  437.79   12.84   450.63  
  97.2%  2.8%  100% 
Transp. & Communication  354.35   17.27   371.62  
  95.4%  4.6%  100%   13 
Source: Own calculations using data from MOFED. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the dominance of education in public budgets is nothing new, and reflects the 
very large recurrent expenditure requirements of teachers’ salaries. 
 





























































Source: World Bank (2004a) 
 
While education absorbs the largest absolute amount of resources nearly in each region, there is 
greater diversity in regions’ relative sectoral emphasis. In Tigray, for example, energy related 
spending constitutes 26% of all energy spending by the regions. In no other sector is Tigray 
region’s share in all regions’ spending as large as in the energy sector. In this sense, while in 
absolute terms spending in Tigray on energy is much smaller than in other sectors (and its per 
capita energy spending is less than in some other regions), one can say that it has a “relative (to 
other regions) sectoral spending emphasis” in the energy sector. Energy is similarly the “relative 
sectoral emphasis” in Amhara and the small region Harari. On the other hand, in Somali and the 
Southern region, agricultural spending is largest in relative terms. Oromiya and the city-state 
Dire Dawa have seen the largest relative expenditures in the transport and communication sector. 
In Afar, natural resource expenditures are not only largest in absolute amount, but also relative to 





The lack of infrastructural development in general, and of energy supply in particular, constitutes 
a tremendous constraint for agricultural development and for the development of rural towns. 
Agricultural productivity is severely inhibited due to reliance on rain-fed production in volatile 
climates, where irrigation facilities are nonexistent in part due to lack of power supply. In rural 
towns without electricity, not only residents but shops and small-scale industry must rely on 
inefficient and insufficient traditional energy technologies, which keeps commercial activity and 
production at low levels and holds back rural growth.  
   14 
As is the case in several other Sub-Saharan African countries, the main source for energy supply 
in rural Ethiopia are biomass resources, e.g. fuelwood and dung. The use of electricity in 
Ethiopia is minuscule. For example only 0.7% of rural households use electricity for lighting 
(Wolde-Ghiorgis 2002). Access to electric power is not only extremely low, but also compares 
unfavourably with other poor countries. Electricity consumption per capita in 2001 was 22 kWh 
in Ethiopia, whereas for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, South Asia, and Least-Developed 
Countries
5 the figure is 456; 331; and 89 kWh, respectively (World Bank 2005b). Other sources 
such as solar power and other renewables, petroleum, and natural gas represent a negligible share 
of total rural energy consumption.  
 
Access to electric power in general, and rural electrification in particular, remains low despite the 
fact that electricity related expenditures have comprised around 90-95% of the energy sector 
capital budget in the course of the past decade (with the rest allocated to petroleum and 
tradition/alternative energy) (Wolde-Ghiorgis 2002), and even though public expenditure on 
energy, while not very high, still measures up against expenditure in other important sectors such 
as public health (see Figure 4).  
 
While public investment in infrastructure is important as part of the government’s agriculture-led 
growth and poverty reduction strategy, the energy sector is not among the key priorities of this 
strategy. As laid out in Ethiopia’s poverty reduction strategy paper (MOFED 2002), the priority 
sectors to receive escalated financing are agriculture (and within that an emphasis is placed on 
the provision of extension services and food security), the water sector (with a focus on rural 
water supply), the road sector (construction and upgrading of trunk roads), education (primary 
education), and health (maternal and child health, malaria, and TB).  
 
 
3.2. Road Infrastructure 
 
Table 5 gives the road density (km per 1000 km
2) for the 15 countries with the lowest road 
density values. It is apparent that, while Ethiopia ranks tenth, those countries with lower road 
densities also have vast areas of uninhabited land, for example the desertous countries of the 
Sahel zone. Measuring road density instead as km of road per million people, the second column 
of Table 5 compares Ethiopia with eastern and southern African economies, and shows that road 
infrastructure in Ethiopia falls very far behind that of other poor countries in the region. With 75 
km per million people in Ethiopia, road infrastructure is substantially worse than in the country 
with the next smallest road capital (Uganda with 120 km per million people). However, the 
drastic upscaling of public investment in roads since the mid 1990s has led to an increase of the 
total roads network in Ethiopia from about 23,500 km in 1995 to 32,000 km in 2001. This only 
constitutes a 35% increase, which is a much more rapid increase than the growth in road 
infrastructure over the years before this period.  
 
Table 5: International comparison on road infrastructure 
 
Table 5a: Countries with             Table 5b: Road density in  
lowest physical road density             Southern and Eastern Africa 
                                                 
5 United Nations classification.   15 
 
Road density in km / 1000 
km
2 
Road density in km / 
million persons (1993) 
Sudan  5.01  Ethiopia
a   75 
Mauritania  7.47  Uganda  120 
Niger  7.97  Tanzania  129 
Mali  12.38  Malawi  277 
United  12.95  Mozambique  277 
Botswana  18.02  Lesotho  315 
Chad  26.53  Kenya  334 
Kazakhstan  30.61  Madagascar  366 
Mongolia  31.43  Zambia  744 
Ethiopia  31.66  Swaziland  765 
Russian  31.81  Angola  816 
Afghanistan  32.21  Zimbabwe  1,360 
Gabon  32.81  South  1,433 
Somalia  35.25  Botswana  2,022 
Congo, DR  37.43 
 
Namibia  2,722 
Source: WDI 2005               Source: FIAS. 
a1991 data 
 
At present, about half of Ethiopia’s roads network is made up of trunk and link roads. The 
remaining are so-called rural roads. The latter are administered by the regional agencies, or Rural 
Roads Authorities, whereas the responsibility for trunk and link roads lies with the federal roads 
agency, the Ethiopian Roads Authority. 
 
As in the case of the education and health sector, public investment and other policy regarding 
roads is laid down in the Road Sector Development Programme (RSDP) developed by the 
Ethiopian Roads Authority in 1997. The RSDP oulines the long-term strategy (over a 10 year 
period) for developing road infrastructure. For the first phase from 1997 to 2002, road building 
projects were to give piority to providing improved access to ports, to existing and new resource 
areas, to food deficit areas, and to maintaining a certain degree of equity of transport 
infrastructure between the regions, in that order. Given these priorities, a relatively large share of 
capital expenditures were allocated for asphalt and gravel roads. Nevertheless, the increase of 
unpaved roads in the latter half of the 1990s by 34% was much higher than the increase of paved 
roads (7%) over the same period (MOFED 2002).  
 
The second phase of the roads sector development programme defining policies and expenditures 
for the 2003 to 2007 period addresses the low level of road connectedness between the regions. 
The main roads radiate from Addis Abeba to the regions, but travel between regional towns is 
substantially more difficult. In the second phase of the RSDP, also greater emphasis was placed 
on developing those type of roads more likely to immediately benefit poor populations, namely 
village rural roads. The strategy document on transport development at the village level stresses 
participation of local communities, not only in formulating investment priorities for rural road 
construction and maintenance, but also in helping to cover these expenses. For this purpose, 
village level associations are assigned the task of proposing and implementing roads projects.   16 
But institutions across all tiers of administration – villages, weredas, regions, and the federal 
level – are involved in various stages of the development of rural roads. 
 
Public investment in roads as a share of spending in the agriculture, social and infrastructure 
sectors really picked up with the change of government. As seen in Table 3 above, this share rose 
from 3%-5% in the 1980s to 15%-20% of spending in these sectors during the ‘90s. Indeed, the 
relative increase in road construction spending is unrivalled by any of the other social, 
agricultural and infrastructure sectors.  
 
Table 6 below shows the geographic distribution of road spending. Comparing the share of each 
region’s (capital) expenditure in total capital spending of all regions with the population shares 
shows that the capital city-state Addis Abeba and the more marginal areas, Benshangul-Gumuz 
and Gambella and to some extent Afar, allocate resources to roads well beyond their population 
shares.  
 
Table 6: Capital and recurrent road infrastructure expenditures for each region, in million 










bella  Harari 
Oromi
a  SNNP  Somale  Tigray 
Regions 
total 
Capital  117.90  17.68  78.31  23.49  -  13.81  0.01  98.50  48.39  24.04  20.63  442.80 
w%  26.6%  4.0%  17.7%  5.3%  -  3.1%  0.0%  22.2%  10.9%  5.4%  4.7%  100.0% 
Recurrent  8.41  0.00  3.86  0.22  -  0.00  0.00  4.74  0.00  0.00  1.06  18.29 
%  46.0%  0.0%  21.1%  1.2%  -  0.0%  0.0%  25.9%  0.0%  0.0%  5.8%  100.0% 
Recurrent as % 
of total  6.7%  0.0%  4.7%  0.9%  -  0.0%  0.0%  4.6%  0.0%  0.0%  4.9%  4.0% 
Pop.  
(in ‘000)
1   2,570  1,243  16,748  551  330  216  166  23,023  12,903  3,797  3,797  65,344 
%  3.9%  1.9%  25.6%  0.8%  0.5%  0.3%  0.3%  35.2%  19.7%  5.8%  5.8%  100.0% 
Source: Own calculations using data from MOFED. 
 
A comparison of Tables 7 and 8 with Table 6 shows that in the case of the road sector, the 
geographic distribution of sectoral performance is broadly aligned with the expenditure 
distribution. We see that road density, measured as km of roads per 1000 people, is consistently 
highest in Gambella, with the second-highest road density being in either Benshangul-Gumuz or 
Affar, depending on the year. However, while population-based road density is highest in the 
marginal regions, it is lowest – or to be precise, zero – for asphalted roads in regions such as 
Benshangul, Gambella, and Somale (interestingly and surprisingly, though, Table 8 shows that it 
is highest for the pastoralist region Affar). When road density is measured in terms of area (km 
of roads per 1000 km
2) Addis Ababa followed by the city-state Harari have the highest density. 
 
Table 7: Density of all-weather roads 
 
  km/1000 persons  km/1000 km
2  
 Region  1995  1996  1997  2003  2004  1995  1996  1997  2003  2004 
Addis Abeba  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   0.71  0.72  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   3659.4  3849.7 
Afar  0.72  1.01  1.00  1.49  1.62  8.7  12.6  12.7  21.3  23.7   17 
Amhara  0.22  0.32  0.32  0.39  0.40  20.8  32.1  32.9  46.0  48.5 
Benishangul-Gumuz  0.84  0.86  0.83  2.54  3.09  8.0  8.4  8.4  29.1  36.4 
Dire Dawa  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   0.40  0.52  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   93.6  126.8 
Gambella  1.70  4.79  4.66  5.86  6.64  12.6  36.3  36.3  52.1  60.5 
Harari  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   0.42  0.67  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   188.8  315.7 
Oromia  0.35  0.52  0.51  0.38  0.38  22.5  34.4  34.4  29.8  31.0 
SNNP  0.21  0.26  0.26  0.37  0.39  19.5  25.2  26.5  43.8  46.8 
Somale  0.37  0.38  0.38  0.82  0.83  3.8  4.0  4.2  10.1  10.6 
Tigray  0.21  0.48  0.49  0.62  0.70  12.0  29.1  30.0  44.1  51.0 
Ethiopia  0.28  0.41  0.41  0.49  0.51  14.0  21.2  21.6  30.1  32.5 
Source: CSA Transportation and Communications Bulletin; Ethiopian Roads Authority. 
 
Table 8: Road density by road type 
 



















Addis Abeba  0.155  0.550  0.000  0.706  804.948  2854.424  0.000  3659.372 
Afar  0.539  0.277  0.673  1.489  7.720  3.971  9.648  21.340 
Amhara  0.049  0.112  0.230  0.391  5.739  13.208  27.010  45.957 
Benishangul-Gumuz  0.000  1.302  1.243  2.540  0.000  14.910  14.238  29.148 
Dire Dawa  0.075  0.244  0.078  0.395  17.650  57.528  18.446  93.624 
Gambella  0.000  2.661  3.199  5.860  0.000  23.650  28.437  52.087 
Harari  0.105  0.133  0.179  0.418  47.462  60.152  81.218  188.832 
Oromia  0.073  0.117  0.194  0.383  5.735  9.190  15.196  30.121 
SNNP  0.031  0.153  0.245  0.428  3.600  18.090  28.913  50.603 
Somale  0.000  0.292  0.523  0.815  0.000  3.632  6.511  10.143 
Tigray  0.060  0.313  0.249  0.622  4.253  22.222  17.672  44.146 
Ethiopia  0.065  0.184  0.255  n.a.   3.977  11.288  15.661  167.408 





As discussed above, agriculture is at the heart of ADLI and is expected to fuel economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Given such a focus on the agricultural sector one would expect to see a 
heavy emphasis on agriculture in terms of resource allocation since 1993 (year of the conception 
of ADLI). Indeed, despite fluctuations, real agricultural expenditure has been on an increasing 
trend (Table 9). The decentralization and intensification of extension services being one of the 
key features of ADLI, expenditure on agricultural extension approximately doubled over the 
1990’s, although it continues to constitute a rather small share of agricultural spending. Table 9 
also suggests that, over time, allocations have shifted somewhat away from natural resource and 
environment-related spending in favour of agriculture. 
 
Table 9: Total national expenditure on agriculture and natural resources  
   (in millions, constant 1995 birr) 
 
Expenditure category  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000   18 
Ministry of Agriculture  196.2  224.9  304.1  363.5  373.1  417.1  388.3  451.0 
Ag. research  78.8  61.5  15.8  31.8  74.0  98.2  105.1  170.1 
Ag. extension  10.7  9.8  18.5  16.9  23.9  26.0  22.2  19.4 
Other ag. services  306.1  223.3  311.3  296.9  181.2  553.9  417.6  303.8 
Seed  -  -  0.3  0.4  0.8  2.7  1.9  3.2 
Fertiliser  -  -  -  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  9.8 
Coffee and Tea Authority  60.2  63.4  24.8  19.5  5.4  7.3  33.6  27.3 
Livestock  -  -  -  -  -  1.6  1.5  2.0 
Co-operatives development  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3.4 
Integrated development  -  -  -  -  -  0.6  1.4  2.2 
Rural infrastructure  16.7  -  -  -  44.6  57.9  -  - 
Other ag. expenditure  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3.2 
Ministry of Water  69.4  109.4  61.5  61.3  55.5  57.6  65.5  93.9 
Water supply  -  248.9  220.5  345.0  346.8  293.4  254.4  196.4 
Other water expenditure  -  -  -  119.2  92.0  134.5  49.1  122.2 
Environment  -  -  -  1.1  1.3  1.6  1.8  3.1 
Biodiversity  -  -  -  -  1.2  1.5  1.6  4.2 





1,203.4  1,159.4  1,383.6  1,252.2  1,654.5  1,344.6  1,415.3 
% Subnational  69.8%  63.4%  71.0%  79.5%  76.2%  58.0%  58.4%  58.1% 
Source: Own calculations using data from MOFED. 
 
Regarding the administrative sources of spending, i.e. the share of expenditure executed by 
subnational administrative units versus the federal government, the last row shows that in the 
1990s regions handled the majority of expenditures in the agricultural and natural resources 
sector although the this share has been in the decline in the recent years. This is somewhat 
surprising, given that it can be expected that the decentralisation process to the regions would 
have become more consolidated over time. 
 
A regional breakdown of real per capita expenditure on agriculture is presented in Table 10. For 
most of the regions, agricultural spending is less than 30 birr per capita. Among the highest 
expenditures however take place in Addis Abeba and Harari, although these regions are 
characterised by higher urban concentration than other regions. Gambella region spends by far 
the largest amounts per capita in agriculture. This is likely a reflection of the overall dramatically 
higher per capita public budget and federal transfers going to Gambella. While the national 
figure for agricultural spending as a whole has moderately increased, the high variation at the 
regional level makes no particular regional spending pattern discernable.  
 
Table 10: Real per capita expenditure on agricultural and natural resources (Birr) 
 
Region  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Addis Abeba  11.76  22.43  50.25  61.91  58.72  44.64  29.66  13.31 
Afar  32.29  16.57  16.09  6.47  18.27  61.27  33.63  24.29   19 
Amhara  8.25  10.40  10.40  11.27  12.12  11.96  9.10  9.69 
Benish.-Gumuz  18.87  23.90  19.84  11.29  14.66  43.24  56.86  36.78 
Dire Dawa  14.42  18.32  17.52  14.16  15.26  14.91  8.39  7.86 
Gambella  52.58  77.29  100.29  134.37  48.88  37.11  35.94  34.80 
Harari  4.49  58.67  32.46  52.92  50.46  21.48  16.63  104.97 
Oromia  10.30  14.76  12.79  20.28  14.93  12.08  10.77  15.50 
SNNP  8.00  12.80  13.16  12.85  10.29  15.25  7.54  7.91 
Somale  3.42  10.47  19.18  18.54  14.58  11.94  25.83  10.65 
Tigray  17.67  19.04  13.80  34.80  26.91  17.18  12.98  12.91 
Ethiopia  16.63  22.08  20.64  23.89  20.97  26.88  21.19  21.68 
Source: Own calculations using data from MOFED. 
 
Agricultural performance has not fully corresponded to agricultural spending patterns. The 
regional distribution of land productivity as an indicator of agricultural performance is illustrated 
in Table 11. Given its favorable agro-ecological conditions Gambela has by far the highest yield 
levels, while on the contrary the arid region Somali together with Afar, Dire Dawa and Harari 
have the lowest yield levels. 
 
Table 11: Yield of annual crops (quintals per hectare) 
 
Region  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Addis Abeba  14.9  12.0  13.0  10.0  10.3  12.6 
Afar  7.9  13.2  7.3  n.a.  12.9  2.5 
Amhara  9.8  10.2  8.9  9.5  9.4  9.5 
Benish.-Gumuz  11.1  10.5  11.4  11.3  10.7  10.2 
Dire Dawa  5.9  11.6  7.4  10.5  10.0  9.2 
Gambella  22.6  17.4  19.3  20.5  19.3  21.5 
Harari  10.4  9.7  7.4  8.5  8.8  7.5 
Oromia  13.1  13.2  12.2  11.7  12.1  12.9 
SNNP  13.3  13.5  12.6  10.6  10.6  11.9 
Somale  7.1  7.3  9.8  5.7  4.7  7.6 
Tigray  11.0  12.3  8.9  10.8  11.1  9.8 
Ethiopia  11.7  11.9  10.7  10.7  10.8  11.2 
Source: calculated using data from CSA’s Agricultural Sample Surveys 1995-2000. 
 
Although there would naturally be a lag period between the time expenditures are made on 
agriculture and results can be observed in terms of agricultural performance, having received 
focused government attention and with increasing investments being channeled to agriculture 
(see Figure 4), it appears that agricultural productivity has not fully responded to investments. 
An extension of this descriptive analysis to examine other indicators of agricultural performance, 
further dissect public services provision within the agricultural subsectors, and the use of a 
longer time series on agricultural sector performance indicators may be warranted to explore 




   20 
The rural literacy rate in Ethiopia (for the population 10 years old and above), while starting 
from a very low base, has shown some improvement in recent years, both in levels as well as in 
the degree of urban-rural and gender disparity. In 1999 the rural and urban literacy rates were at 
22% and 70.4% respectively (MOFED 2002). This constitutes a recent improvent, from 16% and 
70% two years before. The gender gap in rural literacy has improved somewhat recently, with 
the ratio of female to male literacy rate rising from 0.28 to 0.33. However, Ethiopia lags far 
behind in educational outcomes relative to other poor countries (see Table 12). 
  
Table 12: Literacy rate (% of 15 years old and above) 
 
  Male  Female  Gender gap 
  1990  2002  Increase  1990  2002  Increase  1990  2002 
Ethiopia    37  49  12  20  34  14  17  15 
South Asia   59  67  8  34  44  10  25  23 
Sub-Saharan Africa   60  71  11  40  56  16  20  15 
Low income   64  72  8  42  53  11  22  19 
Source: WDI 2005.  
 
However, taking the longer view and in terms of intermediate outcomes in the education sector, 
Ethiopia has made some important progress. Over the last ten or so years, educational coverage 
at all levels has experienced a sustained increase. The greatest success was achieved at the 
primary level, where the gross enrollment ratio more than tripled from 20% in 1993 to 62% in 
2001, the enrollment ratio in secondary education increased from 8% to 12%, and in tertiary 
education from 0.5% to 1.7% (World Bank 2005a; see also Table 13).  
 
Table 13: Primary (grades 1-8) gross enrollment ratio 
 
 Region  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Addis Ababa    84.9    82.9    80.3    82.0    84.7   91.4  118.3  128.4  135.4  142.6 
Afar    8.4    8.4    8.4    8.4    7.1   9.1  11.5  12.6  13.8  14.8 
Amhara    17.9    22.3    28.0    34.6    40.4   46.8  53.3  58.1  58.5  61.8 
Benishangul-Gumuz    35.4    42.8    48.6    69.9    74.9   81.8  88.5  89.1  98.4  100.5 
Dire Dawa    41.0    41.6    50.7    58.9    60.0   62.4  75.7  80.2  78.6  83.2 
Gambella    53.9    50.4    66.3    83.5    89.1   93.7  95.8  102.7  124.6  106.6 
Harari    53.4    54.9    65.6    77.1    90.0   96.2  105.3  107.5  105.0  104.5 
Oromiya    21.2    26.0    30.8    39.6    45.0   51.6  57.9  62.4  66.9  72.7 
SNNPR   28.8    38.4    44.4    55.7    56.8   59.8  63.8  67.5  71.8  74.2 
Somali   11.6    11.6    11.6    11.6    8.0   8.3  10.6  13.1  15.1  15.1 
Tigray    43.7    45.0    45.1    56.1    58.4   63.5  73.9  77.6  73.7  80.6 
Ethiopia   26.2    30.1    34.7    41.8    45.8   51.0  57.4  61.6  64.4  68.4 
Source: Ministry of Education. 
 
Unfortunately, these improvements in coverage have been accompanied by a sustained 
deterioration in educational quality. The national average pupil-to-teacher ratio (PTR) increased 
steadily over the 1990s and into this decade (Table 14). The quality decline has been even more 
precipitous in rural areas. For example, the rural PTR, which at 32 in 1994 used to be better than 
the urban PTR of 34, more than doubled to 73 in 2001, in contrast to the urban ratio of 48 in the   21 
same year. This has dramatically accelerated the burden on teachers in rural areas, which has 
made it more difficult to encourage graduates from cities and towns to take teaching positions in 
the rural areas.  
 
Table 14: Primary school (grades 1-8) pupil to teacher ratio 
 
Region  1992  1995  1999  2000  2001  2002   2003  
Addis Ababa   49  51  46  45  38  41  39 
Afar   29  23  28  29  31  29  32 
Amhara   20  33  62  67  70  70  71 
Benishangul-Gumuz   18  38  50  50  52  49  51 
Dire Dawa   33  38  43  44  41  40  41 
Gambella   22  35  35  36  38  39  48 
Harari   26  36  26  23  24  27  24 
Oromiya   21  32  53  60  66  68  72 
SNNPR  28  51  61  63  66  67  67 
Somali  13  21  37  35  44  52  52 
Tigray   51  47  62  67  69  59  55 
Ethiopia  27  38  56  60  63  64  65 
Source: Ministry of Education. 
 
In 1994, the government adopted the New Education and Training Policy. This reform changed 
the structure of the education system, as the existing system, which was modelled after western 
education systems, was perceived by the government as inappropriate for the realities of 
Ethiopia. The new system, in which primary education is defined as grades 1 through 8, has 
generated pressure on schools’ capacities in the higher secondary grades (as now standardised 
testing doesn’t take place before grade 8) and has led the government to recently drastically raise 
enrollment barriers into the 11
th grade. The 1994 reform also placed a new emphasis on the 
expansion of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and, in the spirit of the 
overall decentralisation policy, required the use of local languages instead of Amharic as the 
language of instruction at the primary level.  
 
The policy focus on TVET translated into a substantial increase of public spending for this 
subsector relative to overall education spending. While recurrent education expenditures 
increased from 1993 to 2001 by 78%, TVET expenditure increased more than 12-fold, or by 
1120% (World Bank 2005a). Recurrent expenditures on higher education also increased 
disproportionately to the overall rise in spending, as it more than tripled. While primary level 
spending constitutes the largest share in education expenditure, it grew more slowly from 1993 
to 2001 than overall expenditure, only by 40%. Possibly to rectify this imbalance, more recently 
in its 2002 poverty reduction strategy the government pronounced the improvement of access to 





On a range of health indicators, Ethiopia has improved modestly and gradually, but is still at a 
very low base. Child mortality has gone from 269 per 1000 live births in 1960, to 204 in 1990, to 
170 in 2002. However, meeting the Millenium Development Goals for health would require   22 
further halfing this figure in the next decade. Immunisation rates, which have been more subject 
to large swings over the decades, the downswings often coinciding with periods of unrest and 
war, has been brought up to slightly above 50%, among the lowest rates even among very poor 
countries (see Table 15). Maternal mortality, at about 500-700 per 1000 births (World Bank 
2004a), is also among the worst in the world. Only about a quarter of the rural population have 
access to any modern health services at all (Russel and Abdella 2002). 
 
Table 15: Immunisation and child mortality rates in 2002:  
     Ethiopia and select African countries 
 
   
Immunisation  
(% 1-2 yrs) 
Mortality rate  
(per 1,000 live births) 
  GDP p.c. DPT  Measles  Infant  Under-5 
Ethiopia  124  56  52  114  171 
Malawi  157  64  69  113  182 
Sierra Leone  165  50  60  165  284 
Tanzania  207  89  89  104  165 
Chad  232  40  55  117  200 
Ghana  429  80  81  60  97 
Source: WDI 2005. 
 
Upon taking power in 1991, the transitional government set as the health priority the 
reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics which have been destroyed or 
looted in the course of the civil war. Wartime destruction had also led to the outbreak of 
epidemics and to the lowest level of health services coverage in 30 years (Kloos 1998). Beyond 
post-war priorities, the health sector formulated directions that departed markedly from the 
previous regime, most notably private participation and more authority to local governments. 
Specifically, the 1993 Ethiopian Health Policy laid out as the key elements of sectoral reform the 
strengthening of primary health care, a new focus on cost recovery mechanisms, decentralisation 
of delivery, and the encouragement of greater participation of the private sector and NGOs in the 
provision of health care (Russell and Abdella 2002). Some of these principles were later 
compromised, as when the Ministry of Health closed private clinics in Addis Abeba in 1996; see 
Kloos (1998).  
 
Table 16: Potential health service coverage (%) 
 
 
Includes health centres and health stations 
 
Includes health centres, 
health stations, health 
posts, and private clinics 
Region  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2001  2002  2003 
Addis Abeba  36.66  93.39  79.37  80.00  72.55  152.49  150.64  155.44 
Afar  57.16  52.70  55.03  49.96  50.75  75.08  72.25  74.06 
Amhara  42.37  43.50  42.55  40.21  15.85  59.72  56.85  51.76 
Benish.-Gumuz  166.79  86.21  161.95  159.48  148.15  206.19  200.86  207.07 
Dire Dawa  72.44  51.52  86.26  54.62  68.92  140.35  103.64  127.03 
Gambella  229.52  87.96  238.74  166.67  136.75  299.55  274.12  226.50 
Harari  137.30  114.46  145.35  134.83  129.73  197.67  205.06  200.00   23 
Oromia  53.17  46.91  52.29  51.47  52.22  66.61  68.03  70.78 
SNNP  49.58  55.06  48.30  48.66  47.18  66.69  65.47  81.08 
Somale  35.96  30.55  35.27  40.98  31.76  46.05  47.98  43.81 
Tigray  65.91  66.24  64.60  67.52  63.46  81.65  86.12  87.04 
Ethiopia  50.71  51.24  51.80  50.97  43.63  70.74  70.22  73.16 
Source: Ministry of Health.  
PHSC is defined in the Ethiopian context as the share of the population that has access to health facilities 10km 
away or less (World Bank 2005c). May exceed 100%. 
 
Access to health services measured by the potential health coverage (see Table 16), has not 
markedly improved when considering only access to health stations/centres. In fact, there 
appears to be a significant decline from 2002 to 2003 in access to such health facilities. This, 
however, may be a feature of the fact that there has been an effort to downgrade health stations 
to health posts which offer predominantly only preventative services. The second half of Table 
16 shows that access to health services from a broader array of health facilities have shown more 
of an increase. While a regional distribution of potential health service coverage is not available 
for years earlier than 1999, MoH (1999) reports nationwide PHSC by health stations/centres to 
have been 38% in 1992, 48.5% in 1996, and 51% in 1997. This suggests, then, that coverage by 
health stations/centres had increased rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, after which it stagnated 
and even slightly declined. Some of this decline has been compensated for by the increase in 
coverage by private clinics. One thing that is striking about the distribution in health coverage is 
the relatively high coverage in regions often deemed marginal by various indexes of 
development. For example, Beneshangul-Gumuz and Gambella show the highest coverage rates. 
This may be a reflection of the strong policy focus on equalising public services between 
regions.  
 
More recently, Ethiopian health sector policy has been guided by the Health Sector Development 
Programme (HSDP).
6 This programme, intended to steer health sector policy for the short and 
medium term, reaffirms the previous focus on improving the accessibility and quality of primary 
health care and to increase the health budget share of total government spending. Indeed, per 
GDP government expenditure on health exceeds the average in South Asia and low income 
countries, but lies below the Sub-Saharan African average. However, public and private 
expenditure on health is a smaller share of GDP than any of the other developing country groups 
(Table 17), which points to the relatively large role that public financing plays in Ethiopia’s 
health sector financing. In absolute terms, spending on health per person falls very short of 
expenditures in Africa, South Asia, and the group of low-income countries. Health expenditures 
per head at $3 are between one-seventh and one-tenth of other low-income economies.  
 
Table 17: Health expenditure in Ethiopia and other low-income country groups, 2001 
 
  Expenditure as % of GDP
  Total  Public 




                                                 
6 Generally, the Sector Development Programmes, which have so far been launched for the road, health, and 
education, and some other sectors, have been motivated by a need to harmonise donors’ activities in these sectors 
and thus use aid money more effectively. Along with a trend in aid agencies, especially the World Bank to place less 
emphasis than in the past on project financing and move toward programmatic lending, Ethiopia’s SDPs have been 
designed in collaboration and with the support of several donors.   24 
Ethiopia  3.6  1.4  40.5  3 
South Asia  4.8  1.0  21.6  22 
Low income  4.4  1.1  26.3  23 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.0  2.5  41.3  29 
Source: WDI 2005. 
 
In the implementation of Ethiopia’s decentralisation policy, the social sectors were those sectors 
for which the devolution of resource allocation responsibility to the lower tiers of government 
was most extensive. Accordingly, the regions accounted for over 87% of government recurrent 
expenditure and nearly all (99%) of capital expenditure in 2001. With the recent deepening of 
decentralisation since 2002, part of regional health budgets are being passed on to weredas. As in 
the decentralisation of spending responsibility in other sectors, here too there have been some 
problems associated with the devolution, as weredas are not fully capable of maintaining 
facilities, do not have adequate staffing (despite the continued deployment of health personnel 
from the regions), and face the challenge of coordination with other weredas for services and 
drugs distribution activities that span a wider geographic space. 
 
In the following sections, we will build on this descriptive overview to expand the inquiry to ask 
how public expenditure in key sectors may have differentially affected welfare of rural 
households. The next section will set the stage by providing the conceptual context of how public 
spending may contribute to rural households’ incomes, by the way that public services affect the 
productivity of household private assets. We also discuss here the possibility of expenditure 
policy itself being influenced by sector-specific levels of development, and what this implies for 
identification in the analysis. 
 
 
4.  Public Spending, Public Services, and Private Assets 
 
Access to public services can have direct as well as indirect effects on household welfare. The 
direct effects include improvements in wellbeing that are usually not captured by monetary 
measures of welfare (Ferroni and Kanbur 1992 incorporate such measures in designing a 
framework for poverty-oriented public expenditure allocation). For example, improved sanitation 
arising from public subsidies in the construction of household latrines will make individuals 
directly better off, given the inherent desireability of improved hygene. The direct effects of 
certain forms of public expenditure may also primarily be manifested through the monetary form 
of welfare, such as public provision of unconditional safety nets transfers, which boosts the 
household’s income directly. 
 
Most public services, however, operate indirectly to make a household better off: by affecting the 
returns to, or the productivity of, the household’s private assets. Public investment in the 
construction of rural roads in a community does not have an inherent value for the community’s 
residents, but enhances their wellbeing by making their means of transport more productive by 
reducing travel time. Access to irrigation infrastructure will affect the welfare of agricultural 
households by increasing the contribution of their agricultural assets to income, such as 
cultivable land. 
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Naturally, the provision of public services may have a mix of both direct and indirect impact on 
wellbeing, such as in the example of access to better sanitation given before, where in addition to 
the inherent (nonmonetary) benefits of improved latrines, health improvements arising from 
these public investments may make household members more productive. In this sense, 
sanitation investments will also affect welfare through increasing the returns to the household’s 
labour assets. Similar mixed effects will obtain with regard to better access to education.  
 
The previous section discussed briefly how access to different types of public services may affect 
households’ wellbeing. But for them to be able to benefit from services and infrastructure, 
resources first need to be committed to provide public services and build infrastructure. When 
assessing how public expenditure results in public capital, several issues that affect the 
transformation of financial resources into services and infrastructure must be considered.  
 
Firstly, an improvement or increase in services/infrastructure can be expected to materialise from 
public investment with a lag. This lag length may differ depending on the type of sector-specific 
service indicator. For example, substantial resources invested in road construction in some region 
may be expected to affect a measure of road capital – road density – within one or two years of 
the investments made. On the other hand, an improvement in the measure of human capital for 
some region – the literacy rate – will arise from education spending only after a longer time 
period has passed (given that children educated today will enter in the literacy rate figure only 
after they become adults). The lag period will also differ for public spending within a given 
sector, depending on the sectoral variable: Enrollment ratio or school density can be expected to 
be affected by spending sooner than the literacy rate.  
 
Secondly, the complementarity, mutual dependence, and sometimes negative externalities (as in 
Ersado et al. 2004) between investments across different sectors will also affect assessment of 
the returns to public investment. This interaction across various forms of public expenditure may 
occur in multiple ways: Firstly, at the expenditure policy or budget process level, the decision to 
spend more in some sector will imply a reduction in resources for another sector. Secondly, 
resources allocated to one sector may also immediately benefit outcomes in another sector. For 
example, public investment in energy that increases town electrification may reduce the use of 
environmentally harmful in-house dungfuel burning practices, thus increasing health outcomes 
directly, especially for female household members. However, such cross-effects are more 
appropriately analysed by assessing the effects of, say, connectedness to electricity on health, 
rather than expenditure on electricity on health, if the within-sector effects of spending are 
already accounted for. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Strategy 
 
5.1. Public Services and Private Assets 
 
This paper explores the relative magnitudes of the returns of different types of public investment 
to rural welfare in Ethiopia. Using the conceptual frame above, we proceed with the analysis in 
three stages. In the first stage, a household consumption equation specifies the role of household 
private assets A for consumption welfare, as well as the effects of access to a range of public   26 
services (PS), which are allowed to operate directly (superscripted d), as well as indirectly 
(superscripted A) by potentially enhancing the productivity of private assets. X constitutes the 
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The dependent variable is the natural log of per-adult-equivalent household expenditure. This 
specification permits a differentiation of the effects of public service access by region, 
agroecological zone, etc. The subscript j, also on the coefficients of interest f, refer to such a 
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where Dj is a dummy equal to 1 if household i is in location j. Note that the public service and 
the private asset terms are still vectors, given that the impact of multiple types of public services 
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for the indirect effects, where  j A  is the mean of the measure of private assets. 
 
 
5.2. Public Services and Public Spending 
 
The second stage estimates the effects of public expenditure on services and infrastructure in 
selected sectors likely to be relevant to the poor. Some of the challenges faced when seeking to 
capture the impact of policy interventions, especially expenditure policy, were discussed in the 
previous section. In addition, public expenditure is a flow measure. As such, an appropriate 
approach to identify from such a measure the effect on sectoral performance at some particular 
point in time would need to take into account the effect of public investments over time, 
especially in cases where results may be expected only with a time lag. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying here that for the purposes of the type of analysis and 
inquiry of this paper, we use the terms ‘public investment’ and ‘public expenditure’ 
interchangeably. Given that ultimately we are not solely interested in the outcomes of public 
investment strictly in terms of physical capital items, this distinction, while critical in other 
contexts, is not useful here. For example, if only interested in the number of school buildings, 
one may want to examine the role of only capital expenditure (which is what is usually referred   27 
to as ‘public investment’ in other contexts) in education for the number of schools in some 
region, disregarding recurrent expenditure in teachers’ salary, supplies, etc. However, when one 
is interested in a broader measure of performance in the education sector, e.g. the primary 
enrollment ratio, then both recurrent and capital expenditure in education must be seen as forms 
of public investment in human capital. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, we refer to the total 
(i.e. recurrent and capital) amount of public expenditure interchangeably as ‘public expenditure’ 
or ‘public investment’.  
 
In the following we discuss alternative approaches used in the literature for determining public 
expenditure impact, with the aim of providing a context for the empirical strategy used in this 
paper. In so doing, we draw selectively on a few studies for illustration. Also, given the concrete 
interest in discussing the merits of certain methodological questions which may inform the 
econometric specification — e.g. how the the flow nature of public spending is handled, and how 
to account for the way that results may be achieved with a time lag — we will focus here only on 
studies that explicitly draw on public spending data in their analysis (as opposed to studies that 
infer public investment effects from public capital returns).  
 
We first consider the aforementioned literature on Ethiopia. Collier et al. (2002) use public 
expenditure data at the national level to compute unit costs of increasing the quantity and quality 
of health care, and conduct simulations using these unit costs. The unit cost approach, while 
illustrative, does not permit accounting for nonexpenditure factors to affect health capital 
variables. Also, as employed here, it does not account for the potential span between intervention 
and outcome. At the same time, expenditure data limitations may necessitate this approach. Fan, 
Zhang and Rao (2004) and Fan et al. (2005) similarly used the unit cost approach.  
 
Agenor (2004) (as other CGE studies) embeds the expenditure variables in a macroeconomic 
general equilibrium model in which public spending affects total demand, government budget 
balance, and taxes, and is affected by the size of each revenue source, etc. The general 
equilibrium approach has the advantage that the multiple pathways from spending to growth and 
poverty in an aggregate-macroeconomic framework are assessed. It is however not clear whether 
the model, which depends on time series data, accounts for the lag with which spending can be 
expected to affect growth via the variables in the model.  
 
Gomanee et al (2003) use quantile regressions on cross-country panel data, in which the effect of 
social sector expenditure on the human development index is introduced contemporaneously. I.e. 
Countries’ HDI index of period t is regressed on expenditure in period t, along with other control 
variables. While in contrast to the unit cost approach, regression estimation permits controlling 
for non-expenditure influences on the outcome of interest, in this particular study, as in the 
previous ones,  the possibility of lagged effects is not explored. 
 
The potential time interval from public resources spent to economic performance realised is 
given greater attention in the less recent study by Devarajan et al. (1996). In this analysis which 
uses a cross-country panel, a 5-year moving average of GDP growth (i.e. from time t+1 to t+5) is 
the dependent variable, on which public expenditure at time t is hypothesised to have an 
influence. This relationship is assessed using various reduced-form estimation methods. This 
structure is intended both to account for investment lags, as well as to mitigate potential   28 
simultaneity arising from public policy usually being driven by economic performance indicators 
such as growth.  
 
An alternative approach to take into explicit account the flow nature of public expenditure and 
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q t j I - ,  refers to public investment in sector s and region j undertaken at time t-q. In this 
case, investments made in each of the t time periods are included, and the effects of spending in 
each year preceding the time period at which the sector-specific outcome variable is measured 
can be differentiated.  
 
One challenge to this approach is the potentially high correlation between the investments in a 
given sector and region, across time. Especially sectors which have a high component of 
recurrent expenditure, e.g. health and education, tend to be relatively stable over time, implying 
that, for example, 
edu
t j I ,  and 
edu
s j I ,  would be highly correlated, which would tend to wash out the 
significance of the investment effects. Secondly, there may be multiple ways how to extract from 
model (1) the parameter of interest. The question of interest here is: How much would a marginal 
increase in public investment in sector s affect performance in this sector? The policy change 
implied here is not a one time-period increase, but rather one that is sustained through time.  
 
In a simultaneous equations model, Fan et al. (2000) and Fan et al. (2002) use a specification in 
the expenditure equations that allows for such lagged effects. On the issue of accounting for lags, 
these two studies differ methodologically from Devarajan et al. in two important ways. Firstly, 
implicitly Devarajan et al. seek to capture lagged effects by assessing the impact of current 
expenditure on subsequent (average annual) growth over five years. This does not permit for a 
parameterisation of the individual effects of spending at different time intervals (e.g. for the 
effect of current spending vs. the effect of spending t years ago). Secondly, in Fan et al. (2000) 
and (2002), the lag length is not assumed to be fixed across all types of spending, but instead the 
appropriate lag structure is determined empirically using the adjusted-R
2 criterion. The potential 
collinearity among the lagged expenditure is addressed by constraining the parameters into a 
polynomial distributed lag structure (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). 
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with initial capital modelled following Kohli (1982) as:  
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where d is the rate of depreciation and r is the rate of interest. Expanding the equation to express 
capital at time t as a function of investment only, gives: 
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Applying this capital formation equation to the public investment context, 
s
jt K  can be interpreted 
as ‘accumulated public investment’. This approach, then, assesses the effect of accumulated 
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The marginal impact of interest is b
s. Unlike the prior approaches in Fan et al. (2000) and (2002), 
estimating the impact of accumulated public investment on public services does not generate 
separate estimates for expenditure effects in different years. But one can derive time-
differentiated effects from the estimated coefficients and the parameters. For example, a one unit 
increase in 
s
jt K corresponds to a [1/(1-d)
q] unit increase in investment in s and j at time t-q. 
Therefore, the implied impact of an increase in public spending at time t-q is b
s/(1-d)
q (which, 
for example, would equal b
s for contemporaneous investment).  
 
The S equations (equal to the number of sectors analysed) are appropriately estimated in a 
systems framework. Firstly, it is likely that shocks that affect the general local economy in 
location j and that affect the random variation in performance or services in sector s may also 
likely affect anaccounted for variation in the services in another sector s' . Secondly, we want to 
allow for cross-sectoral synergies, i.e. the possibility that outcomes in one sector affect those of 
another sector.  
 
Whichever the approach to modelling the impact of expenditure, it is, as with most policy 
interventions, the case that the decision to invest public resources in some activity will be 
influenced by state of affairs in the sector to be invested in. If, for example, the health sector is 
better developed in some region compared to other regions, this may have an effect on spending 
in two ways: A strong equity focus in expenditure policy would imply the tendency to spend less 
per capita on health than in other other regions, holding other factors constant. On the other 
hand, to the extent that a higher density of health facilities and medical staff in this region 
generates greater needs for complementary health resources, such as medical supplies, than in 
locations with fewer facilities per capita, an expenditure policy based on resource needs would 
imply greater resource allocation to the developed region (in the case of this example, this would 
apply to expenditures complementary to facilities, rather than to capital expenditure on health 
centres themselves).  
 
Furthermore, a sectoral expenditure policy primarily concerned with efficiency may lead to 
greater investments in a given sector where performance indicators are already high. For 
example, areas with higher agricultural potential (be this due to agroecological conditions, 
existing high capital base, institutional structures, etc.) may also be those areas in which public   30 
investment in the promotion or provision of modern inputs will generate higher returns in terms 
of agricultural productivity. Even if these areas are less poor than low-potential regions, a 
sectoral strategy driven by efficiency at the sector level, and spending decisions well aligned 
with sectoral strategies, would allocate relatively greater public resources in the agricultural 
sector to better performing areas.  
 
In addition to the question of whether a given region has an equity- or an efficiency-oriented 
policy, other, more indirect, ways in which sectoral development may determine sectoral public 
investment suggest that the direction of this influence is ambiguous. Naturally, the size of public 
expenditure in a sector depends not only on sectoral policy, but also on the overall size of the 
public budget the region has to its disposal. This budget envelope is determined mainly by two 
things. First, regions receive a substantial share of their budget from federal transfers, or block 
grants, as seen in Table 1. Given the features of the broader strategy that led to the particular 
federal structure in Ethiopia, the size of block grants from the federal government to the regions 
is determined to some extent by the emphasis placed by the government on reducing the 
relatively high degree of inequality between regions. Hence, as shown in Table 1, the size of per 
capita transfers from the federal government to Benshangul-Gumuz, a rather underdeveloped 
region, is 87%, whereas the transfers to Addis Abeba only comprise 4% of the Addis Abeba 
budget. However, based on Table 1, the simple correlation between the per capita regional funds’ 
own sources (regionally collected taxes, etc.) other than federal grants on the one hand, and the 
size of per capita grants on the other hand, is -0.70. This suggests that the equity focus of federal 
fiscal policy is manifested in the actual transfers made. 
 
However, other forces pull the relationship between regional sectoral development and sectoral 
spending in the other direction. In particular, the second major component of regions’ budgets is 
their own revenue raising capacity. Better developed regions are generally better equipped to 
generate their own revenue through taxes, user fees, etc. This source of regional budgets 
therefore tends to be higher where sectoral performance indicators are also higher. Through this 
link between level of regional development and own-revenue raising capacity, then, higher 
sectoral development tends to contribute, holding other factors – including federal transfers – 
constant, to more public resources, and that in turn to higher levels of public expenditure in any 
given sector.  
 
In sum, to the extent that there is potential simultaneity in estimating the impact of sector-
specific public investment on sectoral performance variables, the direction of the possibly 
ensuing bias cannot be conclusively determined. However, given the large size of transfers in 
regions’ budgets, given that transfers tend to be higher when own revenue raising capacity is 
lower (see above), and given that the overall size of the budget seems to be a significant factor in 
the size of sectoral investment, the possible downward bias in the estimate of the effect of 
spending on sectoral outcomes arising from equity oriented policies is likely to be limited, given 
that (regions’) sectoral investment decisions are not made centrally but regionally, and the 
impact of the variation in regions’ total public budgets may wash out the possible trend of higher 
development of some sector in a region resulting in lower resource commitment. 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot be certain that the various possible divergent effects of sectoral 
development on spending will cancel each other out. Hence, noting the role of the overall   31 
regional budget envelope for the size of sectoral spending, we will instrument the accumulated 
public investment variable with the size of expenditure on public administration for each region. 
This expenditure item is not associated with capital, recurrent, overhead, etc. of any particular 
sector. Rather, it includes spending on the regional council, the regional finance bureau, the 
regional court system, etc., i.e. expenditure items that are not expected to directly impact 
performance measures in road infrastructure, health, education, etc., and yet will be highly 
correlated with the amount of spending in the sectors of interest. 
 
Given the high likelihood that the sector-specific performance indicators may be all affected by 
shocks to the economy not captured in the equations, thus creating correlation of the error terms 
across equations, the latter are estimated as a system in order to capture the efficiency gains of 
system estimation in the context of cross-equation error correlation. We employ the above 
instruments in a System-2SLS framework.  
 
 
5.3. Linking Public Spending with Household Welfare 
 
In the third stage of analysis, we use the results of both the estimation of sector-specific 
performance variables on household welfare, and public spending on the sectoral performance 
indicators, to compare the effects of an increase in per capita public expenditure in various 
sectors on household wellbeing measured by household consumption. For most sectors, these 
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i.e. the effect of interest for sector s and region j.  
 
The standard errors of the welfare effect of spending are obtained using the delta method 
(Oehlert 1992): Let  ) ˆ (g h  be an m-dimensional (linear or nonlinear) function of the parameter 
estimator vector gˆ, i.e.  ) ˆ (g h  =  )] ˆ ( ),..., ˆ ( [ 1 g g M h h , with the 1 x K parameter vector gˆ consisting 
of estimators from both 1
st stage and 2
nd stage regressions, i.e.  ]' ' ˆ ' ˆ [ ˆ f b g = . The variance-
covariance matrix of this function of parameters can be estimated using the delta method: 
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;   k = 1, …, K; m = 1, …, M. 
 
and  ) ˆ r( a ˆ v g  is a simultaneous robust covariance matrix on the estimator vector (which, as earlier 
mentioned, comprises of parameters from two different models). 
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In the case of our model, the function  ) ˆ (g h  takes on the simple nonlinear form of equation (3), 
i.e.  ) ˆ (g m h  =  m m b f ˆ ˆ × , and here M = K/2, which is also the number of parameters from each 
regression involved in a nonlinear function. Hence, we can simplify the expression for the 
standard errors of the multiplicative function to:  
 
  [ ] )) ˆ ( ( r a ˆ v g h diag m D  = 
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6.  Data and Estimation 
 
For both the descriptive and econometric analysis, this paper uses multiple sources of data. The 
analysis of the determinants of rural household welfare draws on an Ethiopian national 
household budget survey, referred to as the Household Income Consumption and Expenditure 
Survey (HICE) collected by the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) in 1999/2000. Given that we 
focus in this paper on rural welfare, only the observations on rural households of the HICE are 
used. Part of the data on households’ access to public services is obtained from CSA’s Welfare 
Monitoring Survey for the same year as the HICE mentioned above.  
 
The analysis also includes data on sectoral performance from a World Bank database of a range 
of economic, agricultural, and demographic variables at the zone level. Public expenditure data is 
made available by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). Expenditure 
data exists yearly from the 1993/94 fiscal year to 2000/01 and includes expenditures of the 
federal government and of the regions (and for the later years partially of the districts and other 
administrative units) and is disaggregated by functional and economic classification. Further 
sector-specific data, usually disaggregated by region and available for multiple years, obtained 
from the respective line ministries is drawn on primarily in the descriptive presentation. The 
latter also makes use of agricultural variables, including yield, labour productivity in agriculture, 
etc. which are obtained from multiple years of CSA’s Agricultural Sample Survey (AgSS).  
 
Table 18 provides descriptive statistics on the variables included in the first-stage regression 
(further descriptives on regression variables are presented in the tables of section 3), and Table 
19 gives the estimation results from the first stage. Indicators of performance, and thus of access 
to services, are included for four sectors seen as important for welfare enhancement in rural 
areas: road infrastructure, health, agriculture, and education. Underlying the specification is the 
hypothesis that higher average performance in agriculture, and better access to roads, will affect 
the contribution of rural households’ agricultural assets to their welfare. Access to education, 
proxied for by the primary school enrollment rate, is interacted with the household’s labour 
assets, given that better access to educational services is expected to make labour more 
productive. Access to health services, represented by the potential health coverage is introduced 
in the regression directly, to capture in a simple form the multiple channels through which it may 
be welfare enhancing. The sector-specific variables are measured as zonal averages. 
 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics on hypothesised determinants of household expenditure 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation   33 
Log of per adult-equivalent household expenditure  7.23  0.48 
Households with male head (%)  0.77  0.42 
Age of head  43.66  14.97 
Household size in adult-equivalents  3.43  1.35 
Distance in km to fuel source for cooking  2.07  3.86 
% in town using public transportation  0.58  0.28 
% in town using public telephone  0.12  0.13 
Years household lived in this house  9.00  10.10 
Number of agricultural assets held by the household  3.79  1.79 
Number of working-age household members (labour assets)  2.57  1.40 
 
As the results in Table 19 show, there is strong variation across regions in the effects of access to 
roads on the contribution of agricultural assets to rural household consumption. Interestingly, this 
effect is strong and significant in two neighbouring but agroecologically quite different regions, 
Affar and Amhara regions, the former being a predominantly pastoralist region and the latter 
consisting of mostly sedentary and partly agropastoralist households. As the discussion on 
Tables 8 and 7 suggested, Gambella and Affar have relatively high road density, although they 
are often referred to as backward regions. Amhara’s road density is medium to high compared to 
other regions.  
 
Table 19: Public services and private Assets: Determinants of household welfare 
 
Dependent variable: ln(household consumption per adult-
equivalent) 
Ordinary least squares estimation with robust standard errors, errors 
corrected for EA cluster-effects 
   
Gender of head (male dummy)  0.0219  
  (0.015)   
Age of head  -0.0052
** 
  (0.002) 
 
Age of head squared  0.0000
  
  (0.000) 
 
Household size in adult-equivalents  -0.1015
*** 
  (0.010) 
 
Distance in km to fuel source for cooking  -0.0018
  
  (0.002) 
 
% in town using public transportation  0.1209
*** 
  (0.046) 
 
% in town using public telephone  0.1198
  
  (0.104) 
 
No. of years household lived in this house  0.0006
  
  (0.001) 
 
Ag. (productive) assets  -0.0036
  
  (0.019) 
 
Labour assets  -0.0329
* 
  (0.018) 
 
Ag. (productive) assets * road density: 
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Affar   0.0794
*** 




























  (0.022) 
 
Ag. (productive) assets * land productivity: 
 
Affar   -0.0018  
  (0.002)   
Amhara  -0.0001  




  (0.009) 
 
Dire Dawa  0.0100
*** 
























  (0.002)   
Labour assets * primary enrollment rate: 
 
Affar   -0.0430  
  (0.096)   
Amhara  0.1234
*** 




  (0.023) 
 
Dire Dawa  0.0839
** 




  (0.021) 
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Harari  0.1082
*** 
















  (0.028) 
 
   
 
Potential health coverage  0.0863
** 




  (0.068) 
 







Road density: km roads per 1000 persons. Primary enrollment rate: Gross primary school (grades 1-8) enrollment 
ratio. Yield: Average physical yield of all annual crops. 
Standard errors in parenthesis and italicised. Coefficents significant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level. 
 
The direction and significance of the effect in the case of the Southern region is, however, 
surprising, even though the magnitude of the effect is small. We find an interesting analogue 
between the results for this region and those regions referred to above, found to have high 
welfare returns to access to roads. Referring again to Table 7, the SNNP is seen to have the 
poorest access to roads in all the years for which data is available. Taken together, one tentative 
conclusion that may be drawn is that there appear to be increasing returns to access to all-
weather roads, in terms of the gains in private household assets’ productivity that such access 
affords. 
 
The specification also provides an option for examining whether the returns to households’ 
agricultural assets in terms of household consumption increase when average agricultural 
performance is high. Unlike in the case of road infrastructure, here the effects among those 
regions for which significant estimates were obtained are substantially less varied between 
regions. Zonal-average agricultural productivity shows the strongest effects on the productivity 
of rural households’ productive assets in Dire Dawa and Harari. Given that in these two regions 
the cities of Dire Dawa and Harer dominate, this may suggest that rural households’ proximity to 
major markets considerably increases the returns from high (physical) agricultural productivity. 
 
Access to education, repesented by the primary enrollment rate, interestingly shows the highest 
returns to labour assets in the Somale region (which, along with Afar, has the lowest enrollement 
ratios along with Afar, see Table 13), followed by Amhara and Harari regions (the latter of 
which has among highest enrollment achievement, along with Gambella). The lowest among the 
significant effects are for Oromia and SNNP regions. In contrast to infrastructure, it appears here 
that access to education leverages households’ labour assets most in those regions where the 
levels of access are lowest, and vice versa.    36 
 
Table 20 estimates the impact of different types of public spending on the sectoral performance 
variables discussed above in the context of the first stage results, as specified in (2) (Table A4 in 
the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for these variables to the extent not already presented 
in the tables of Section 3). The unit of analysis is the zone. The public spending variables are 
measured at the regional level, due to data being insufficiently disaggregated to the zonal level in 
a consistent way for all years considered.  
 
Note that since each column reflects estimation of four sector-specific effects in a system of 
equations framework, each of these equations has its own constant, measure of fit, etc. The 
primary specification is in column (1). The other estimations are included to examine the 
specification robustness of the agricultural sector equation. Specification is varied with respect to 
two factors: the inclusion of cross-sector effects, and the inclusion of effects related to 
agricultural inputs.  
 
We select a priori the first specification as the primary one, since the effect of the provision of 
the inputs included (improved seed, fertiliser, irrigation, and pesticides) are heavily dependent on 
public expenditure in Ethiopia, and thus their effects should be accounted for through the public 
investment variable. Secondly, a priori we also hypothesise that there exist cross-sectoral 
synergies, especially for agriculture. A better road infrastructure may reduce transactions costs 
both for agricultural input as well as for the marketing of agricultural outputs, both potentially 
leading to improved productivity. Similarly, in areas with greater exposure to health risks, 
agricultural labour productivity may be lower, which, ceteris paribus, may reduce yields. Care is 
taken not to assess cross-sectoral effects by determining the impact of expenditure in one sector 
on outcomes in another sector, but rather by assessing the influence of realised outcomes (or in 
the case of health, the existent risks) in one sector on those in another.  
 
We also focus the determination of cross-sector effects on agriculture. Complementarities across 
sectors can be expected where the “affected” sector is measured by a (sectoral) performance 
variable, rather than a more intermediate variable. For example, were the dependent variable in 
the health equation a measure of how exposed to ill health a population was, e.g. maternal 
mortality or child stunting, then it would be necessary to account, for example, for how levels of 
education (via income effects and information), or how agricultural performance (via its likely 
impact on access to food) would affect the health dependent variable. However, since the 
dependent variable in this second-stage estimation, health service coverage, can be better 
understood as an intermediate health outcome variable, such cross-sector effects on the health 
variable are not hypothesised.  
 
Table 20: Effect of public expenditures in four sectors (System-2SLS estimation)  
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
Road infrastructure                 
ROD K   0.0200 
***  0.0198 
***  0.0198 
***  0.0199 
*** 
  (0.0016) 
  (0.0016) 
  (0.0016) 
  (0.0017) 
 
sh.urban  0.8020 
   0.8449 
   0.8498 
   0.8210 
  
  (0.9171) 
  (0.9149) 
  (0.9136) 
  (0.9183) 
   37 
pop.dens.  -0.0009 
   -0.0009 
   -0.0009 
   -0.0009 
  
  (0.001) 
  (0.001) 
  (0.001) 
  (0.001) 
 
const.  -0.0636 
   -0.0545 
   -0.0535 
   -0.0596 
  
  (0.2085) 
  (0.208) 
  (0.2077) 
  (0.2087) 
 
 
PI effect (% incr. in y)  1.741%     1.724%     1.724%     1.732%    
Agriculture and natural 
resources   
   
   




  0.0053 
   0.0043 
   0.0048 
   0.0052 
  
  (0.0047) 
  (0.0045) 
  (0.0045) 
  (0.0050) 
 
rain  0.0010 
   0.0016 
   0.0017 
   0.0007 
  
  (0.001) 
  (0.0011) 
  (0.0011) 
  (0.0011) 
 
land/hh  -1.8399 
*  -2.4291 
**  -2.3066 
**  -1.9083 
  
  (1.1043) 
  (1.1038) 
  (1.0496) 
  (1.2102) 
 
althi  0.4119 
   -0.2071 
   0.0250 
   0.3896 
  
  (0.801) 
  (0.8165) 
  (0.8012) 
  (0.8557) 
 
sh.seed   
  6.1748 
   3.7125 
    
 
   
  (12.471) 
  (12.5625) 
   
 
sh.irrig.   
  6.5832 
***  6.2182 
***   
 
   
  (2.4808) 
  (2.3737) 
   
 
sh.pest.   
  8.5298 
   5.9558 
    
 
   
  (5.8802) 
  (5.7887) 
   
 
sh.fert.   
  1.9239 
   1.2438 
    
 
   
  (2.5736) 
  (2.4643) 
   
 
dist.road  -0.2615 
***   
  -0.1719 
*   
 
  (0.0958) 
   
  (0.0966) 
   
 
malaria.vuln.  -1.5380 
    
  -1.4675 
    
 
  (1.3649) 
   
  (1.353) 
   
 
const.  13.3064 
***  9.5935 
***  11.5570 
***  11.1098 
*** 
  (1.9437) 
  (1.5861) 
  (1.8616) 
  (1.7317) 
 
 
PI effect (% incr. in y)  0.047%    0.038%    0.043%    0.046% 
 
Education   
   
   
   
 
EDU K
  0.0014 
***  0.0014 
***  0.0014 
***  0.0014 
*** 
   (0.0002) 
  (0.0002) 
  (0.0002) 
  (0.0002) 
 
 sh.urban  -0.3934 
*  -0.4350 
**  -0.4351 
**  -0.3961 
* 
   (0.212) 
  (0.2075) 
  (0.2074) 
  (0.2125) 
 
 dist95  -0.0320 
***  -0.0319 
***  -0.0319 
***  -0.0320 
*** 
   (0.0096) 
  (0.0096) 
  (0.0096) 
  (0.0096) 
 
 const.  0.5122 
***  0.5044 
***  0.5043 
***  0.5117 
*** 
  (0.0546) 
  (0.054) 
  (0.054) 
  (0.0547) 
 
 
PI effect (% incr. in y)   0.235%    0.235%    0.235%    0.235% 
 
Health   
   
   




  0.0026 
***  0.0026 
***  0.0026 
***  0.0026 
***   38 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0005) 
 
sh.urban  -0.0580 
   -0.0528 
   -0.0506 
   -0.0689 
  
  (0.3361) 
  (0.3318) 
  (0.3317) 
  (0.3369) 
 
malaria.vuln.  0.1413 
   0.1417 
   0.1418 
   0.1406 
  
  (0.1184) 
  (0.1183) 
  (0.1182) 
  (0.1184) 
 
const.  0.4374 
***  0.4375 
***  0.4375 
***  0.4373 
*** 
  (0.0806) 
  (0.0806) 
  (0.0805) 
  (0.0806) 
 
 
PI effect (% incr. in y)   0.316%     0.316%     0.316%     0.316% 
 
   
   
   
   
 
R
2    
   
   
   
 
Road infrastructure  82.6%     82.6%     82.6%     82.6%    
Agriculture  25.3%    31.7%    38.4%    9.9%    
Education  58.6%    58.5%    58.5%    58.6%    
Health  56.4%     56.4%     56.4%     56.3%    
 
￿
2 (p-value)   
   
   
   
 
Road infrastructure  218.2 
***  216.3 
***  216.7 
***  212.6 
*** 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
 
Agriculture  28.6 
***  21.1 
***  15.0 
**  4.3 
 
     (0.0015) 
     (0.007) 
     (0.020) 
     (0.365) 
 
Education  64.3 
***  64.3 
***  57.1 
***  57.0 
*** 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
 
Health  64.2 
***  64.3 
***  62.7 
***  62.9 
*** 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
     (0.000) 
 
 
Variables: sh.urban = share of population that is urban; dist95 = zonal-average distance in km to the nearest school; rain 
= mean rainfall  in mm; land = avg hh land size (ha); althi = mid/highlands dummy; malaria.vuln. = share of population 
that is vulnerable to malaria; pop.dens. = population density (population per km
2) ; sh.seed = share of cultivable land 
using improved seeds; sh.irrig = share of cultivable land that is irrigated; sh.seed = share of cultivable land using 
pesticides; sh.seed = share of cultivable land using fertiliser; dist.road = average distance in km to the nearest dry 
weather road.  
Standard erros are in parenthesis and italicised. N = 53. Coefficents significant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% 
level. 
 
Table 20 shows that the results of all the other three sectors are very stable vis-à-vis the changes 
in specification in the agriculture equation. The coefficients in the agriculture equation also do 
not change much. The variable of interest, agricultural spending, is somewhat reduced when 
agricultural inputs are included (e.g. comparing col. 4 with col. 2, or col. 1 with 3). The standard 
errors are not affected. Interestingly, including the cross-effects somewhat increases the 
expenditure coefficient (compare col. 4 with 1, or 2 with 3). 
 
Except in the case of agriculture, the public expenditure variables are highly significant for all 
sectors. The magnitudes of the coefficients on public investment are not directly comparable 
with each other given the different units in which the dependent variables are measured. 
Therefore, the last row in each equation of the system compares the percentage increase from the 
mean values of the sectoral performance variables implied by a one-birr increase in per capita 
public expenditure in each of the sectors. For example, a one-birr increase in per capita public   39 
expenditure in education is associated with a 0.24% increase in the primary enrollment rate, and 
a 0.05% increase in land productivity. The largest percentage increase is achieved in the road 
sector.   
 
While this last interpretation of the expenditure coefficients makes comparison of expenditure 
returns across sectors somewhat more feasible given that the units of measurement are equal, the 
difference in the underlying outcome variables means that these figures are still only indicative 
of the comparative contribution of spending in the different sectors. By assessing household 
welfare effects, the third stage estimation allows for more direct comparability. As discussed in 
section 6 above, the third stage estimation draws on those of the first two stages of the analysis, 
using (3), to assess the effect of a marginal increase in per-capita public expenditure in various 
sectors on rural household consumption (Table 21). While the first stage regression already 
showed that two regions seem to stand out in terms of the strong effect that access to roads 
appeared to have on consumption, here the effect of road infrastructure expenditure on household 
consumption is quantified. For example, a one birr increase in per capita expenditure on roads in 
Affar and Amhara lead to an more than nine birr increase in per capita consumption of rural 
households of these two regions.
7  
 
As mentioned previously, the negative effect in the Southern region is puzzling, although the 
magnitude of the effect is limited. The possibility that strongly increasing returns in road 
investments may lie behind these findings can only be a part of the explanation, as that may 
address why returns are lower in the Southern region than elsewhere, but not why they are 
negative. Further reflection on this may call for exploring, and modelling explicitly, other 
mechanisms by which road infrastructure may have a bearing on household income, in addition 
to the returns to agricultural assets. More specifically, to the extent that better accessibility of all-
weather roads encourages formerly agricultural households to begin nonfarm enterprises and 
facilitates access to the wage labour market by making travel to locations of employment easier 
and cheaper, improved road density may in fact reduce the returns to agricultural assets to the 
extent that agricultural production becomes less dominant as a livelihood for some households. 
 
Table 21: Impact of per capita public expenditure on household welfare 
 
  Roads
  Agriculture  Education
  Health
 
   
             
Afar  9.571 
***  -0.056    -0.239 
      
  (1.877) 
  (0.075)    (0.533) 
     
Amhara  9.177 
***  -0.004    0.685 
***     
  (2.680) 
  (0.049)    (0.225) 
     
Benshangul-Gumuz  2.438 
   0.024    0.157 
      
  (4.561) 
  (0.288)    (0.130) 
     
Dire Dawa   
  0.317    0.466 
**     
   
  (0.293)    (0.200) 
     
Gambella  1.691 
   -0.228    0.037 
      
  (1.169) 
  (0.272)    (0.114) 
     
                                                 
7 The first-stage coefficients were first transformed so that the third stage results reflect the impact of spending on 
per-adult-equivalent household expenditure, rather than its log, for ease of interpretation.   40 
Harari   
  0.302    0.601 
***     
   
  (0.286)    (0.165) 
     
Oromiya  -0.084 
   0.178    0.322 
**     
  (3.004) 
  (0.166)    (0.164) 
     
SNNP  -2.772 
***  0.133    0.326 
**     
  (0.740) 
  (0.126)    (0.161) 
     
Somale  10.360 
   0.150    1.799 
**     
  (8.588) 
  (0.306)    (0.810) 
     
Tigray  0.852 
   0.235    0.052 
      
  (2.600) 
  (0.222)    (0.153) 
     
Average effect   
       
  0.354 
** 
   
       
 (0.175) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and italicised. Associated estimates significant in 1
st-stage estimation in bold. 
Coefficents significant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
 
The effects of spending on agriculture may be interpreted with caution, given that the standard 
errors obtained via the delta method are not significant. Nevertheless, some tentative findings 
can be established. The strongest effects of spending appear to have been realised for rural 
households in the two “city-states” Harari and Dire Dawa. Here, a one-birr increase in spending 
results in a greater than 0.3 birr increase in per capita household consumption. Among those 
regions for which the coefficents are significant in the 1
st stage estimation, the returns in terms of 
household welfare of a birr increase in agricultural spending varies from 0.13 to 0.31 birr. 
Comparing this to the results on road expenditure, the latter displays both much lower as well as 
much higher effects, depending on the region. In other words, returns to agricultural 
expenditures, though not uniform, tend to be much more stable across regions than returns to 
roads spending. What is also noticeable, however, is that the highest returns to road spending are 
substantially higher than the highest returns to agricultural spending. 
 
The returns to public spending on education appear to be larger than those to agricultural 
expenditure, but still substantially fall short of the road investment returns. As with the level of 
returns, also the interregional variation of the returns lies between those in agriculture and road 
infrastructure. Among the regions with coefficients significantly different from zero, a birr 
increase in education spending is associated with somewhat over a 0.3 birr increase in household 
expenditure at the lower end of the spectrum (Oromiya, SNNP), and in the largest case with a 1.8 
birr increase in household expenditure (Somale). Health expenditure effects, here not 
differentiated by region, have a positive, moderate and statistically significant effect on average 
rural household welfare. 
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Returns to road investments are both significantly higher than returns to other spending, as well 
as much more variable across regions. This regional variability in returns to road investment 
suggests careful consideration as to where household welfare impact of roads is highest. There is 
tentative evidence that there may be increasing returns to road spending, with higher returns in 
those areas which have a better developed road networks, and vice versa. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning again that, reflective of the government’s policy to attend to regional   41 
inequality in various development indicators, better road networks are found in what are usually 
referred to as marginal regions. 
 
The household expenditure impact of per capita public expenditure in agriculture and in 
education are smaller but also less variable across regions than the effects of road spending. The 
largest effects of agricultural expenditures on rural households are observed in two small regions 
that are dominated each by a major town. While proximity to markets has not been explicitly 
estimated in this model, it appears that the the relatively high returns to agricultural spending for 
rural residents in Dire Dawa and Harari regions may be capturing just that. Returns to public 
expenditure on education lie in magnitude between returns to agriculture and infrastructure 
expenditures. 
 
Some useful steps may be taken to strengthen any conclusions arising from this analysis, or 
alternatively shed light on further insights about the relative effectiveness of different types of 
public spending. Firstly, while this paper assessed how rural households’ consumption is affected 
by public expenditure, it will be important and insightful to go beyond average welfare effects to 
using these results to simulate the poverty effects of public spending. Secondly, given the 
prominence of agriculture-driven development in Ethiopia’s current poverty reduction strategy, it 
may not be doing full justice to the policy dimension of this enquiry to examine the impact of 
public expenditure in the aggregate. Specifically, the role of the various components of such 
investment, notably agricultural extension, agricultural research, and food security spending, 
would be parsed out. The lack of availability of regionally disaggregated time series data on 
spending in the subsectors of agriculture necessitated an analysis of agricultural expenditure as a 
whole. More effort in collection of such data, e.g. from the regional bureaus of agriculture, 
would alleviate this constraint. 
 
An issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the analysis of which would constitute 
highly complementary research especially as an input into policy, is the issue of the efficiency of 
public spending. The utility of public investments for household welfare and poverty reduction 
depends on at least two things: first, the portfolio of the public budget, or the appropriateness of 
the allocation of resources across sectors, and second, the efficiency with which resources are 
used in any given sector or subsector. This paper focused on the former issue. In a way, the 
results of this paper provoke an inquiry into the second question, especially, in the Ethiopian 
context, with respect to agricultural investments, both because agriculture strongly dominates 
Ethiopia’s economy, as well as because the government’s development strategy has emphasised 
the agricultural sector. Especially given that a substantial body of research suggests that a 
strategic focus on agriculture may be appropriate given the stage of development of Ethiopia, an 
investigation into the drivers of efficiency in the country’s agricultural public spending may be 
the important next step in policy research in Ethiopia. 
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Table A1: Per capita household expenditure, based on the Household Income, 
Consumption and Expenditure (HICE) Surveys 
 
  1999  1995 
   total  urban  rural  rural 
Growth ’95-’99 
rural 
Addis Abeba  2465.66  2482.87  1540.35  1685.89  -8.6% 
Afar  1537.71  2302.04  1127.01  1520.46  -25.9% 
Amhara  1165.59  1754.39  1095.67  974.42  12.4% 
Benshangul-Gumuz  1158.31  2014.27  1088.44  1074.99  1.3% 
Dire Dawa  1766.95  1899.32  1394.43  1682.83  -17.1% 
Gambella  1330.32  1898.10  1255.71  1706.66  -26.4% 
Harari  1904.90  2106.19  1618.71  2388.73  -32.2% 
Oromia  1208.40  1701.01  1144.48  1282.91  -10.8% 
SNNP  1080.07  1768.86  1025.18  1021.34  0.4% 
Somale  1626.71  2106.72  1395.12  1975.42  -29.4% 
Tigray  1189.45  1536.65  1120.86  1209.60  -7.3% 
Ethiopia  1222.45  1921.02  1109.92  1136.59  -2.3% 
Source: CSA (2001). 
 
 
Table A2: Per adult-equivalent household expenditure, based on the Welfare Monitoring 
(WM) Surveys 
 
Region  Zones  1995  1999  Growth 
Addis Ababa    1543.3  1521.0  -1.4% 
Afar    2038.6  1770.1  -13.2% 
Amhara (1)  E. & W. Gojam, Agawi    1493.4  1937.8  29.8% 
Amhara (2)  N. & S. Gondar     1264.0  1629.2  28.9% 
Amhara (3)  N. Wollo, Wag Hamra     1211.1  1430.1  18.1% 
Amhara (4)  S. Wollo, Oromiya Zone, N. Shewa  1483.3  1501.8  1.2% 
Benishangul-G.    1296.7  1347.0  3.9% 
Dire Dawa    1595.9  1573.9  -1.4% 
Gambela    1464.3  1021.6  -30.2% 
Harari    2615.7  1901.4  -27.3% 
Oromiya (1)  E. & W. Hararghe     2087.8  1631.3  -21.9% 
Oromiya (2)  E. & W. Wellega      1732.9  1809.7  4.4% 
Oromiya (3)  E. Shewa, Arsi, Bale, Borena   1664.4  1599.8  -3.9% 
Oromiya (4)  Illubabor, Jimma      1893.4  1501.4  -20.7% 
Oromiya (5)  N. & W. Shewa     1965.1  1928.8  -1.8% 
SNNP (1)  Hadiya, Kambata, Gurage     1319.9  1197.3  -9.3% 
SNNP (2)  N. & S. Omo, Derashe, Konso  1708.0  2059.0  20.5% 
SNNP (3)  Sidama, Gedeo, Burji, Amaro    1257.8  1106.9  -12.0% 
SNNP (4)  Yem, Keficho, Maji, Shekicho, Bench   1492.9  1514.9  1.5% 
Somalie    2597.2  2313.3  -10.9% 
Tigray    1412.8  1409.9  -0.2% 
Source: World Bank (2005d)   46 














Roads  27.4  3.8  17.8  5.1  0.0  3.0  0.0  22.4  10.5  5.2  4.7  100 
Education  7.9  2.6  21.9  2.0  0.9  2.9  1.0  33.7  18.3  2.7  6.2  100 
Health  8.4  4.5  21.7  3.8  1.2  2.3  1.9  23.6  15.4  5.1  12.1  100 
Agriculture  1.0  4.1  23.4  2.9  0.6  1.0  0.3  31.0  25.2  5.5  4.9  100 
Natural resources  27.8  13.1  13.8  1.5  0.3  0.4  0.4  22.2  8.8  2.8  8.9  100 
Energy & Mining  0.0  0.5  51.6  1.0  5.5  0.0  11.4  3.5  0.7  0.0  25.9  100 
Transport & Comm.  26.6  4.1  14.6  3.7  6.5  0.0  0.0  41.4  0.3  2.6  0.2  100 
Other  24.3  6.3  16.4  4.5  1.9  2.4  1.2  16.5  13.8  7.0  5.7  100 
Total  15.8  5.1  19.4  3.4  1.1  2.2  1.0  24.8  15.8  4.9  6.6  100 
Population  3.9  1.9  25.6  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.3  35.2  19.7  5.8  5.8  100 





Table A4: Zonal averages for selected variables used in 2
nd stage regression (see Table 20) 


























Afar                         
Afar 1  1.8890  1.6280  100.0%  14.2%  12  no  282.7  0.60  0.00%  99.34%  0.00%  0.37% 
Afar 2  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  2.5%  9  no  268.5    0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Afar 3  11.2440  12.8280  100.0%  26.7%  12  no  501.4  0.30  0.10%  0.24%  7.86%  9.64% 
Afar 4  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  1.5%  15  no  439.1    0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Afar 5  0.6670  27.8720  100.0%  0.0%  62  no  648.1    0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Amhara                         
Agewawia  2.5420  12.7460  41.8%  10.8%  156  yes  1635.5  1.23  2.81%  1.09%  0.43%  46.48% 
East Gojam  2.1970  8.6230  33.7%  10.2%  153  yes  1306.0  1.10  3.17%  0.11%  1.28%  44.16% 
North Gonder  2.5670  6.6540  53.2%  13.4%  62  no  1295.7  1.22  1.32%  0.06%  0.52%  10.39% 
North Shewa  3.0130  8.7490  41.8%  11.2%  123  yes  1114.5  1.10  0.61%  0.33%  5.39%  26.22% 
North Wolo  4.3150  7.0560  27.6%  8.4%  126  yes  820.9  0.70  1.29%  0.03%  0.53%  7.66% 
Oromiya Zone  7.7470  6.5620  100.0%  10.2%  138  no  959.7  0.60  0.04%  0.03%  0.48%  6.31% 
South Gonder  2.5620  13.4100  47.0%  7.9%  153  yes  1275.6  1.00  0.81%  0.22%  1.31%  19.49% 
South Wolo  1.7170  5.9640  42.2%  11.8%  158  yes  1048.8  0.70  0.88%  0.26%  0.25%  15.73% 
Waghamera  10.4750  18.5850  100.0%  5.1%  42  yes  705.6  0.90  0.07%  0.11%  0.26%  1.51% 
West Gojam  2.2080  6.2270  52.8%  7.2%  175  yes  1459.7  1.10  6.97%  0.47%  1.02%  52.09% 
Bensh.-
Gumuz                         
Asosa  2.3820  1.8950  58.8%  9.4%  18  no  1228.6  0.99  0.67%  0.00%  0.90%  5.60% 
Kemeshi  n.a.  15.9800  83.6%  0.0%  7  no  1543.7  1.24  3.05%  0.00%  0.22%  5.45% 
Metekel  5.9440  10.7300  84.7%  11.5%  10  no  1283.7  1.40  1.69%  0.02%  0.16%  15.06% 
Dire Dawa                         
Dire Dawa  1.2030  1.0690  100.0%  73.1%  237  no  729.7  0.50  13.22%  9.75%  1.09%  20.79% 
Gambella                         
Gambela 1  5.6550  1.6280  100.0%  50.3%  12  no  1347.0  0.20  0.00%  0.00%  1.08%  0.74% 
Gambela 2  n.a.  4.7790  100.0%  9.6%  3  no  1403.1  0.50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Gambela 3  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  1.8%  14  no  1028.7  0.20  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   47 
Gambela 4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  11.9%  26  no  1699.0  0.60  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Godere  n.a.  8.5690  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Harari                         
Harari 1  0.7400  0.7690  100.0%  61.2%  452  yes  799.8  0.60  3.00%  3.92%  4.60%  55.58% 
Oromiya                         
Arsi  3.2870  5.4980  17.1%  11.7%  120  yes  978.0  1.25  1.35%  0.16%  23.91%  72.36% 
Bale  1.2230  2.6700  29.6%  12.8%  27  no  690.0  1.01  1.12%  0.04%  14.09%  39.14% 
Borena  4.6610  2.8410  27.7%  11.0%  27  no  675.1  0.50  1.50%  0.00%  0.31%  10.41% 
East Harerge  2.2110  4.0330  74.1%  6.5%  113  no  701.7  0.50  2.91%  2.01%  2.32%  40.39% 
East Shewa  1.1120  1.4570  93.4%  30.7%  176  yes  900.4  1.40  3.70%  0.00%  15.69%  55.18% 
East Welega  3.4640  8.7930  81.9%  13.2%  79  yes  1659.1  1.20  7.38%  0.11%  1.65%  40.22% 
Illibabor  4.0610  7.9560  94.7%  11.3%  73  yes  1918.3  1.10  8.82%  0.02%  5.82%  26.67% 
Jimma  2.2720  6.1120  29.5%  11.6%  147  yes  1666.4  0.90  5.60%  0.00%  22.25%  36.07% 
North Shewa  3.4120  5.7910  35.9%  8.9%  138  no  1600.4  1.20  1.00%  0.10%  4.79%  29.76% 
West Harerge  3.0080  2.1780  68.5%  9.1%  98  yes  885.0  0.70  1.62%  1.36%  0.32%  16.93% 
West Shewa  3.0740  4.0600  17.6%  11.6%  150  yes  1288.4  1.20  2.87%  0.23%  26.13%  56.43% 
West Welega  4.4450  6.7790  69.5%  10.3%  86  no  1600.4  1.00  6.84%  0.17%  1.56%  30.37% 
SNNP                         
Amaro  3.5420  12.1200  100.0%  3.7%  93  yes  927.0  0.40  0.87%  9.80%  1.91%  8.50% 
Bench-Maji  3.6800  6.5310  18.0%  8.6%  18  no  1296.8  0.30  2.00%  0.00%  0.00%  7.00% 
Burji  2.2080  3.6070  100.0%  13.6%  33  no  964.0  0.70  0.24%  0.00%  2.03%  6.33% 
Derashe  5.0000  6.2080  100.0%  10.8%  86  no  1113.0  0.80  0.02%  3.49%  0.27%  0.90% 
Gedio  1.7100  3.1250  57.7%  13.7%  505  yes  1564.8  0.30  1.87%  0.00%  0.00%  31.17% 
Gurage  3.6290  5.6980  20.0%  5.9%  239  yes  1111.4  0.50  10.49%  0.09%  10.78%  61.80% 
Hadiya  2.5370  4.4290  43.9%  7.7%  371  yes  1148.0  0.60  6.35%  0.02%  33.66%  82.82% 
Keficho-Shek.  2.6050  12.2380  34.0%  9.2%  71  yes  1886.9  0.70  1.00%  0.00%  5.00%  5.00% 
Kembata  2.3040  4.6850  59.4%  8.4%  395  yes  1089.3  0.60  6.21%  0.00%  18.57%  71.94% 
Konso  1.6470  4.2890  100.0%  4.2%  88  no  878.0  0.60  0.00%  2.66%  0.03%  30.55% 
North Omo  3.3470  8.4940  77.4%  8.1%  144  yes  1463.4  0.40  5.29%  0.00%  0.47%  40.04% 
Sidama  2.3960  2.9780  75.7%  8.4%  382  yes  1235.9  0.30  13.51%  0.13%  0.00%  49.93% 
South Omo  3.6320  7.8740  85.4%  8.0%  19  no  784.5  0.40  2.26%  0.05%  0.55%  3.54% 
Yem  5.4170  6.3370  n.a.  2.0%  94  yes  1214.0  1.10  4.18%  0.00%  4.69%  39.90% 
Somale                         
Afder  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  8.1%  6  no  232.8  0.60  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Degehabur  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  21.1%  9  no  355.9  1.50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Fiq  n.a.  n.a.  87.8%  10.9%  18  no  337.0  1.50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Gode  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  23.9%  12  no  193.8  0.80  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Jijiga  7.8540  0.8260  87.5%  21.3%  58  yes  599.8  1.30  0.49%  0.13%  0.12%  0.17% 
Korahe  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  17.2%  10  no  340.1  0.70  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Liben  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  10.6%  14  no  440.6  1.30  0.00%  0.00%  0.15%  0.92% 
Moyale Zone  n.a.  3.3260  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Shinele  5.9170  1.6390  100.0%  16.6%  13  no  493.6  1.20  7.02%  52.19%  0.44%  17.54% 
Warder  n.a.  n.a.  100.0%  8.6%  7  no  159.2  1.40  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Tigray                         
Central Tigray  3.0590  6.8800  68.8%  11.6%  111  yes  782.7  0.80  0.49%  0.13%  2.09%  46.25% 
East Tigray  4.0160  3.9280  n.a.  17.4%  111  yes  564.3  0.50  1.40%  0.18%  0.59%  42.44% 
Mekelle  0.2390  0.7280  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
South Tigray  5.0690  7.1220  30.4%  27.7%  96  yes  677.5  0.84  2.25%  2.89%  1.35%  18.39% 
West Tigray  4.2200  12.2620  100.0%  13.9%  34  no  1089.3  1.00  0.04%  0.10%  0.63%  33.90% 
Source: World Bank data for the draft Country Economic Memorandum. 